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Abstract
Do social identity ties facilitate the spread of violent conict? We assess whether the Israeli-
Palestinian conict causes hate crime towards Jews and Muslims in the U.S using daily data
between 2000-2016. We measure the timing, intensity and instigator in the conict using the
number of conict fatalities and U.S. mass media coverage of the conict. Analyses using both
conict measures nd that conict events trigger hate crimes in the following days following
a retaliatory paern: Anti-Jewish hate crimes increase aer Israeli aacks and anti-Islamic
hate crimes increase aer Palestinian aacks. ere is lile evidence that the ethno-religious
group not associated with the aacker is subjected to hate crimes. Moreover, the lack of
an eect of non-violent conict reporting suggests that hate crimes are not triggered by the
salience of the Israeli-Palestinian conict in itself. Our ndings suggest that victimization
transcends the locality of the conict, implying that violent conict may be more costly than
existing research suggests.
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1 Introduction
Since 2010, 27 countries have experienced violent ethnic conicts withmore than 25 bale-related
deaths per year (Vogt et al., 2015). At least 500 million people have ethnic ties to these conicts
and reside in countries not involved in the conict.1 Existing research shows that conicts are
more likely to spill over when there are ethnic ties between the regions or countries (e.g. Black,
2013). One explanation is that violent conict abroad generates animosity and induces violence
at home towards groups with identity ties to the conict (Bosker and de Ree, 2014). However,
this specic transmission channel has not been investigated empirically.
We examine if social identity ties facilitate the spread of violent conict. Research on con-
ict spillover primarily focuses on cross-border contagion of civil conict (see, e.g., Black, 2013;
Silve and Verdier, 2018), and its economic and nancial spillovers (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007,
2010; Korovkin and Makarin, 2019). Cross-border ethnic ties have been identied as an important
transmier of conict and violence (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Kuran, 1998) and several studies
conclude that cross-border conict contagion is more likely when one or more ethnic ties be-
tween countries are strong (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; De Groot, 2011; Bosker and de Ree, 2014;
Harari and Ferrara, 2018). ese studies, however, face important identication challenges. First,
what appears to be conict spillovers might be driven by unobserved regional variables, such as
demand or supply shocks, that correlate with ethnic composition.2 Second, even in the case of
actual conict spillover, it is dicult to disentangle ethnic ties from the vast array of mechanisms
that have been proposed to spread conict violence across borders (see, e.g., Blaman andMiguel,
2010; Silve and Verdier, 2018).3 ird, even if ethnic ties are pivotal for the spread of violence, it
is still unclear exactly why. Except for the spurring of animosity through social identities, ethnic
violence might spread for instrumental reasons (Weidmann, 2015). For example, political success
of co-ethnics abroad might shi beliefs about the chances for political success at home, increasing
the risk of insurgencies and violent confrontations.
In this study, we empirically isolate the cross-border spread of violence through increasing
animosity by looking beyond the geographic and contextual vicinity of the conict. By liing
1ese estimates are based on calculations using the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012)
and data from the Joshua Project (joshuaproject.net). First, using the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset, we identify
all conicts that are currently ongoing or ended aer 2010. We then map the ethnic groups involved in the conict
to data from the Joshua project, which contains data on the size of ethnic groups in all countries of the world. We
then sum the number of individuals which belong to the ethnic group involved in the conict, that reside in another
country than the conict country.
2See McGuirk and Burke (2020) for a recent study on the eect of economic shocks on conict and for further
references.
3For instance, the existence of regionally active violent underground actors and markets for violence, which has
been shown to facilitate the spread of violence (Silve and Verdier, 2018), might be correlated with cross-border ethnic
ties.
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the analysis out of a context where the eruption of civil conict is at risk, it is unlikely that
observed spillovers are caused by unobserved variables or channelled through alternative mech-
anisms to inter-group animosity. We, thus, also emphasize a largely overlooked consequence of
violent conict – its potential to induce violent criminal behavior in seings far beyond its vicin-
ity. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such violent spillovers can be non-trivial and global. For
example, German media reported on clashes between Turkish and Kurdish diaspora in response
to the Turkisk military operation into northeast Syria in 2019. In France, Turkisk, Azeri and Ar-
menian diaspora clashed following the escalating conict in Nagorno-Karabach in 2020.4 In our
seing, the Israeli-Palestinian conict has been reported to trigger hate crimes and animosity pri-
marily against Jews in both the U.S. and Europe.5. is type of mechanism is also supported by
studies on how anti-Islamic hate crimes are triggered by jihadist terrorist aacks targeting U.S.
or Western European civilians, such as the 9/11 aacks in the U.S. or the 7/7 aacks in London
(Disha, Cavendish and King, 2011; King and Suon, 2013; Hanes and Machin, 2014; Ivandic et al.,
2019). Terrorist aacks have furthermore been shown to induce ethnic discrimination within the
criminal justice system (Shayo and Zussman, 2011), even against other ethnic groups than those
of the terrorists (McConnell and Rasul, 2018). Yet, these studies on terrorist aacks focus on the
eect on hate crimes or discrimination in the country and by the populace under aack, and
are mute on how identity ties may facilitate the spread of animosity among individuals who are
neither involved in any conict nor targets of violence.
We contribute to the literature on spillovers of violent conict by providing causal evidence of
how ethnic violence induces violent behavior towards individuals perceived to have identity ties
to the conict actors. We do this by focusing on one of the most longstanding and divisive violent
conicts fought along ethnic and religious lines in the postwar era: the Israeli-Palestinian conict.
Using daily data between 2000 and 2016, we examine if the Israeli-Palestinian conict causes hate
crime towards Jews andMuslims in the U.S. Since the groups associated with conict actors in the
Israeli-Palestinian conict map onto distinct hate crime categories, anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic
hate crime, this makes the conict well-suited for examining social identities as a channel of
conict spillover.6 Anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes are the twomost common religiously
motivated hate crimes in the U.S., accounting for approximately 12% and 4% of the estimated
250,000 annual hate crimes (BJS, 2013). e geographic and contextual distance between the
4See “Brawls between Kurds and Turks injure several across Germany”, Deutsch Welle, 17-19-2019, Accessed
04-08-2021, and ”Video shows Turkish and Azeri nationals ’looking for Armenians’ in France”, e Independent,
29-10-2020, Accessed 04-08-2021.
5For examples in the U.S. see e.g. “2014 Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents”, Anti-Defamation League, Accessed
24-05-2021. For Europe, see e.g. FRA (2018) and Enstad (2017)
6e FBI (2018) denes hate crime as ”a criminal oense commied against a person, property, or society that is
motivated, in whole or in part, by the oenders bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnic-
ity/national origin.”
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Middle East and the U.S. and our choice to estimate the eect of the conict on hate crime within
a time window of a few days ameliorates several of the endogeneity problems from previous
studies. is makes it plausible that we isolate the eect of animosity transmied through the
identity of the victim as perceived by the perpetrators.
We use two data sources to measure the intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conict. First, we
use data on fatal aacks from the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem. Second, we use
data on the daily length of U.S. television evening news coverage of the conict, which we code
by aacker, collected from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive. Both data sources distinguish
aackers from victims, enabling us to examine if the identity of the aacker maers for which
group is victimized in the U.S. Compared to the fatalities data, the news data is beer at capturing
the degree to which U.S. audiences are exposed to events from the conict and how the events are
framed. is is important since previous research shows that the Israeli Defence Forces appear
to time aacks to minimize U.S. news coverage (Durante and Zhuravskaya, 2018) and it is well
known that media can play a key role in the spread of violence in general (Dahl and DellaVi-
gna, 2009; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004) and ethnic violence in particular (DellaVigna et al., 2014;
Yanagizawa-Dro, 2014). e news data also contain information on non-fatal aacks and pro-
vide us with a measure of non-violent conict news, which we use to test whether the salience
of the conict itself aects hate crimes.
We nd the same paern using both conict measures: anti-Jewish hate crimes increase af-
ter Israeli aacks and anti-Islamic hate crimes increase aer Palestinian aacks. e eects are
primarily driven by days with large aacks and days with extensive media reporting. Fatalities
from Israeli aacks today and yesterday in the top percentile (40 fatal victims or more) increases
the expected number of anti-Jewish hate crimes by 35%. e analogous Palestinian aack (10
fatal victims or more) increases the expected number of anti-Islamic hate crimes by 44%. Simi-
larly, news reporting on Israeli violence today and yesterday in the top percentile (3 minutes or
more) increases anti-Jewish hate crime by 23% and top percentile news reporting on Palestinian
violence (2.3 minutes or more) increases anti-Islamic hate crime by 38%.
e identifying assumption of our empirical strategy is that the timing of conict news, Is-
raeli aacks and Palestinian aacks are not endogenous to hate crime incidents or hate crime
reporting in the U.S. is would, for example, be a concern if both conict fatalities and hate
crime levels increase on religious holidays for reasons unrelated to the conict or if aacks are
timed to important events in the U.S. that also aect the levels of hate crime. To alleviate such
concerns, we control for religious and federal holidays, as well as major political events and U.S.
news pressure. Overall, our results are largely unaected by dropping various conict periods,
indicating quite homogeneous eects over time. In addition, using our news data, we show that
news reporting on violence in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War increased hate crimes against Jews
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and Muslims in the U.S., showing that our ndings at least generalize to the broader Arab-Israeli
conict. We also nd lile evidence of violent spillover on ethnic groups that are not associated
with the conict actors (cf. McConnell and Rasul, 2018), which strengthens the claim that the
results are not driven by joint periodicity, such as seasonality eects, of conict intensity and
hate crimes in the U.S. Finally, the results are robust to dropping individual states that dominate
hate crime reporting and using alternative model specications and lag structures.
Taken together, the ndings indicate that perpetrators, in our seing, are driven by a retal-
iatory motive. First, the identity of the aacker maers for which group in the U.S. is subjected
to hate crimes. Second, there is no eect of non-violent conict news on hate crimes. ird, re-
porting on violence from the conict does not trigger hate crimes towards Blacks and Hispanics
and, thus, there is no general eect of violent news reporting on hate crimes. One possible expla-
nation for this paern is that perpetrators identify with aack victims and that conict violence
generates a retaliatory motive towards the ethno-religious group associated with the aacker.
For example, perpetrators may share an ethnic or religious aliation with the victimized conict
actor, or may identify with this actor because of political convictions or religious beliefs. An alter-
native explanation, which is not mutually exclusive and cannot be ruled out, is that perpetrators
do not have such ties, but primarily have strong out-group biases against Jews and/or Muslims.
is could be the case for white supremacists and hate groups. For such a paern to emerge, vio-
lence commied by a specic conict actor must then more eectively trigger animosity directed
towards the associated group in the U.S.
e ndings from this study show how social identities facilitate the spread of violence and
contribute to our understanding of how, when and where conict can have violent spillovers.
By doing so, we also add to the literature on the determinants and triggers of animosity and
hate crimes. Because hate crimes incur greater physical and psychological damages for the in-
dividual (Iganski and Lagou, 2015), as well as more severe and persistent costs on their targeted
communities, they are considered to be particularly serious compared to similar non-hate moti-
vated oences. For example, Gould and Klor (2016) show that the increase of anti-Islamic hate
crimes in the U.S. in the aermath of 9-11 had large and lasting eects for the entire U.S. Muslim
population, inducing a slow-down of the assimilation of American Muslims, strengthening their
ethnic identity, and lowering female labor force participation. Our ndings can be informative
for policy-makers aiming to mitigate or prevent such violence and criminal behavior. is could
be relevant both at the domestic level, i.e. for law enforcement agencies, but also for international
policy-makers aiming to predict and mitigate the spread of violence.
We structure the article as follows: Section 2 provides a brief background on the conict and
its religious and ethnic dimensions. Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical analysis.
Section 4 and 5 present the empirical strategy and results, respectively, while Section 6 concludes.
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2 e Israeli-Palestinian Conict and its Religious and Eth-
nic Dimension
e Israeli-Palestinian conict is rooted in the partitioning of Mandatory Palestine into Israel and
Palestine by the UN in 1947. e existing borders between the state of Israel and the occupied
Palestinian Territories were established in a series of wars in 1948, 1967 and 1973 between Israel
and neighboring Arab states, that led to Israel occupying the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Our analysis covers the period 2000-2016 and the subsequent section will describe the conict
dynamics in detail during this period. Although in many ways a territorial conict between
Israelis, Palestinians and neighbouring states, the conict also has salient religious and ethnic
dimensions with actors on both sides, for example, using religion as a means of legitimizing their
claims on specic territory.
e religious dimension of the conict is conated with the ethnic dimension, since both par-
ties to varying degrees depict the conict as ethnic (see e.g. Levi 2008 and Klug 2003). is may
fuel anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim responses to the conict. For example, Klug (2003) argues that
“hostility towards Israel is liable to spill over into hostility towards Jews as such”, implying that
Jews in general may become subject to animosity and hate crime regardless of their religiosity or
relationship to Israel. Previous research suggests that the same mechanism may aect Muslims.
For example, King and Suon (2013) show that jihadist terrorist aacks in the U.S. trigger ani-
mosity and hate crimes directed at American Muslims. We hypothesize that a similar mechanism
is at play in the Israeli-Palestinian conict, despite the fact that Israeli and Palestinian aacks
occur in the context of a two-sided conict, are not directed towards Americans or westerners,
and are not proximate to either victims or perpetrators of hate crimes.
To the extent that Jews, Muslims andArabs in the U.S. are associatedwith actors in the conict
by potential hate crime perpetrators, these groups risk becoming subject to hate crime when
the conict ares up. In 2015, the Jewish population in the United States was estimated to be
6.7-6.8 million (Dashefsky and Sheskin, 2015). e total number of U.S. citizens who consider
themselves to have direct ancestry to Palestine, or any of the surrounding Arab countries that
have been directly or indirectly involved on the Palestinian side, is estimated to be 1.9 million
(USCB, 2016).7 A 2016 Gallup survey found that 2.1% of the U.S. population identify as Jewish
and 0.8% identify as Muslim.8
7e Census Bureau denes ancestry as the ethnic origin, descent, roots, heritage, or place of birth of the per-
son or of the persons ancestors. We include descendants of Algerian, Bahraini, Egyptian, Emirati, Iraqi, Jordanian,
Kuwaiti, Lebanese, Libyan, Moroccan, Omani, Palestinian, Qatari, Saudi Arabian, Syrian, Tunisian, and Yemeni ori-
gin.
8“Five Key Findings on Religion”, Gallup, 23 December, 2016.
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3 Data
is section describes the data on hate crime incidents, conict fatalities and conict news, and
presents an analysis validating that our measurement of conict news captures signicant events
in the conict.
3.1 Hate Crime Data
Data on incidents of hate crime in the U.S. are obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR),
which are compiled and supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Under the Hate
Crime Statistics Act of 1990, all law enforcement agencies in the U.S. are asked to submit counts
of hate crime incidents in their jurisdiction.9 Participation is voluntary for agencies and has
gradually increased during our period, increasing from 11,690 agencies in 2000 to 15,254 agencies
in 2016. is accounts for 90 percent of all agencies, covering 290 million people or 90 percent of
the U.S. population (FBI, 2018). Existing research shows that participation of agencies is related
to demographic and political characteristics of jurisdictions (see e.g. King 2007; McVeigh, Welch
and Bjarnason 2003). Under-reporting of hate crimes, both on the part of police agencies and
individuals, is a well-documented and persistent problem (e.g. BJS 2013 and King, Messner and
Baller 2009). We ameliorate the selection problem by estimating the eect of the conict on hate
crimes by comparing the number of reported hate crimes within the span of a few days of an
aack or event. Consequently, it is unlikely that any reporting bias across jurisdictions or over
longer time periods pose a threat to establish causality. However, since we are using data on
reported hate crimes, we cannot rule out that the treatment eects reect a short-term change in
reporting behavior among police agencies or victims and not actual changes in the prevalence of
hate crime incidents.
Anti-Jewish hate crimes are the second most common hate crime category in the data, aer
anti-Black hate crimes, and constitute around 13% of all hate crimes. is makes it the most
common religiously motivated hate crime. Anti-Islamic hate crimes are the second most common
religiouslymotivated hate crime, accounting for 2% of all hate crimes. Figure 1 shows themonthly
number of reported anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes between 2000-2016 in the US. e
two types of hate crime converge during the period: anti-Jewish hate crime steadily decreases and
anti-Islamic hate crime increases somewhat.10 Two distinct spikes in hate crime are seen. Anti-
Jewish hate crimes spike in October 2000, coinciding with the start of the Second Intifada11. Anti-
9If possible, the agencies should provide data on the nature of the oense, location, and characteristics of the
oender and victim.
10Long term trends in reported incidents might reect trends in reporting or agency participation and should be
interpreted with caution.
11is period of intense ghting commenced in September/October 2000 with a number of controversial events,
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Islamic hate crime peaks in weeks andmonths following the 9/11 terrorist aacks, as documented
by King and Suon (2013) and Byers and Jones (2007). Since this period of extreme anti-Muslim
hate crime levels coincides with the Second Intifada, we omit the six months following the 9/11
aacks in our main analysis.
Figure 1: Number of Anti-Jewish and Anti-Islamic Hate Crimes in the USAAggregated PerMonth
Note: Data from FBI (2018). e gure shows the number of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes per month in
the U.S. between 09-29-2000 – 12-31-2016. Note that this gure includes the 9/11 period, which we exclude in the
other gures and tables which contain hate crime data.
Our data includes 13,652 accounts of anti-Jewish hate crime and 2,606 accounts of anti-Islamic
hate crime. Anti-Islamic hate crime oenses more oen include aggravated and simple assault,
while most anti-Jewish hate crimes in our sample are vandalism oenses. Geographically, most
anti-Jewish hate crimes occurred in New York, New Jersey and California and most anti-Islamic
hate crime occurred in California, Michigan, and New York. e most common location for both
anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime is at the residence of the victim. Both types of hate crimes
are distributed uniformly across the month of the year and weekdays. Appendix Tables A1 and
A2 show summary statistics for the type, location and seasonal variation of anti-Jewish and anti-
Islamic hate crime in our sample.
including the visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount. e connection between the start of the Second Intifada
and hate crimes in the U.S. were also identied by various U.S. news outlets in October 2001. See, for instance, “New
Hostility in Mideast Echoes in a Brooklyn Neighborhood”, New York Times, 10-05-2000, Accessed 09-04-2019.
7
3.2 Data on the Israeli-Palestinian Conict
Data on aacks by Israelis and Palestinians comes from the Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights B’Tselem.12 Every fatal aack by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) or Palestinian militants
from 29 September 2000, the start of the Second Intifada, to the end of 2016, are included.
As can be seen in Figure 2, our sample period is characterized by periodically intense ghting
between the Israeli Defence Forces and Palestinian militants. In September 2000, Palestinians
initiated an uprising against the Israeli occupation, the Second Intifada, which lasted until 2005,
claiming approximately 3,000 Palestinian and 1,000 Israeli civilian and military lives. e Second
Intifada was initiated aer Ariel Sharon, then candidate for Israeli Prime Minister, made a visit
to the Temple Mount. is led to protests among Palestinians, at times violent, which were
struck down by the Israeli army. e confrontations intensied with a major military operation,
Operation Defensive Shield, launched by Israel into the West Bank in 2002, and several suicide
bombings directed against Israelis from Palestinianmilitants. e ve years of the Second Intifada
account for 78% of Israeli casualties and 35% of Palestinian casualties in our sample.
Aer the Second Intifada, the conict is characterized by long periods of low intensity ghting
alongside highly intensive conict periods due to three major Israeli military operations. e
three operations shared the stated purpose of halting rocket aacks from theGaza strip into Israel.
In December 2008, Israel initiated Operation Cast Lead, also known as the Gaza War, inside the
Gaza Strip. e subsequent three weeks of ghting resulted in over 1,000 Palestinian fatalities and
13 Israeli fatalities. In 2012, Israel launchedOperation Pillar of Defense, as a response to intensied
exchanges between Palestinians and Israel. e eight day operation resulted in approximately
150 Palestinian casualties and 6 Israeli casualties. In 2014, Israeli launched a seven week military
operation, Operation Protective Edge, in the Gaza Strip. Rocket aacks had intensied following
another Israeli military operation in Gaza, a response to the kidnapping and murder of three
Israeli teenagers byHamasmembers. Approximately 1,200 Palestinians and 70 Israelis were killed
during the operation. e three military operations cover approximately 1.3% of the sample days,
but account for 40% of Palestinian casualties and 7% of Israeli casualties.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of aacks by and fatalities from each side for eight con-
ict periods. e table shows the total number of victims of Israeli and Palestinian aacks, the
average number of victims per day, and the share of days that had an aack, for each conict
period and the entire sample. e three aforementioned Israeli military operations were partic-
ularly intense, generating respectively 61, 22 and 46 fatalities per day on average. In contrast,
the periods between Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense and aer Protective Edge are characterized
by less intense violence, with a daily incidence of fatalities of 13% and 21%, respectively, driven
12e B’Tselem data is commonly used in scholarship on the Israeli-Palestinian conict. See, for instance, Jaeger




















































































































































































































































































mostly by Palestinian victims. e incidence of fatal aacks is generally high. 35% of the days in
our sample had a fatal aack, averaging 1.7 victims. is is mainly driven by the high frequency
of fatal Israeli aacks. While only 7% of the days in our sample had at least one Israeli victim, 35%
of the days had at least one Palestinian victim. ere is considerable overlap between days with
Israeli victims and days with Palestinian victims, especially with regards to Palestinian aacks.
70% of days with a Palestinian fatal aack also have an Israeli aack. Conversely, 15% of days
with a Israeli fatal aack also have a Palestinian aack.
Columns 5-8 in Appendix Table A1 present summary statistics of the total number of fatali-
ties on each side and the distribution across weekdays and calendar months. ere were a total
of 1,111 Israeli victims from Palestinian aacks and 9,036 Palestinian victims from Israeli aacks.
Neither Israeli nor Palestinian aacks show a strong clustering on weekdays compared to week-
ends. Victims from Palestinian aacks are evenly distributed over months while Israeli aacks
are clustered in January and July, which is primarily driven by the Israeli operations Cast Lead
and Pillar of Defense that took place during those months.
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Days in period 1570 1441 23 1395 8 593 50 858 5938
Fatalities
Israelis
Fatalities 957 106 9 26 6 10 69 45 1228
Fatalities/day .61 .07 .39 .02 .75 .02 1.38 .05 .21
Daily inc. of fat. .19 .04 .22 .01 .38 .01 .32 .03 .07
Palestinians
Fatalities 3237 1669 1398 342 169 78 2222 283 9398
Fatalities/day 2.06 1.16 60.78 .25 21.13 .13 44.44 .33 1.58
Daily inc. of fat. .61 .36 1 .12 1 .09 .9 .2 .35
Total
Fatalities 4194 1775 1407 368 175 88 2291 328 10626
Fatalities/day 2.67 1.23 61.17 .26 21.88 .15 45.82 .38 1.79
Daily inc. of fat. .66 .38 1 .13 1 .1 .9 .21 .35
US Conict Reporting
Minutes/day covering…
Israeli aacks .32 .04 4.84 .04 .17 .02 1.91 0 .14
Both sides aacking .61 .09 3.86 .01 10.73 .04 3.57 .01 .25
Palestinian aacks .34 .04 0 0 1.25 .02 .34 .01 .11
Non-violent news .33 .2 .08 .08 0 .09 .26 0 .17
Total 1.6 .38 8.78 .13 12.15 .16 6.08 .03 .67
Share of days with reporting .4 .12 1 .04 .88 .04 .78 .02 .16
Note: Data from the B’Tselem. e exact sample period is 09-29-2000 – 12-31-2016, including the 9/11 period. e upper panel of the table shows descriptive
statistics for both Israeli and Palestinian fatal aacks split into 8 specic conict periods, and in the last column, for the total sample period. e conict periods
are described in the top row of the table. For each conict period, the table shows the number of days in the period, the total number of Israeli and Palestinian
fatalities, Israeli and Palestinian fatalities per day on average, and the average daily incidence of Israeli and Palestinian fatal aacks. e last three rows show
the same statistics for Israeli and Palestinian fatalities combined. e boom panel shows the average length of U.S. conict news reporting on the conict from
NBC, ABC, CBS and all three networks combined per day. e last row shows the share of days with conict reporting.
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3.3 Conict News Data and its Association with Conict Fatalities
To measure U.S. mass media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conict, we collect information
from the evening news on three main TV networks from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive
(VTNA). We focus on the three major networks that have a well-dened 30 minute time slot for
evening news every day: ABC, CBS and NBC.
Between 2000 and 2016, VTNA contains more than 15,000 evening news broadcasts and more
than 200,000 individual news stories. For each individual news story, VTNA provides a headline,
a summary, the length in seconds, as well as the order of appearance of the story in the full
evening news broadcast. To identify news stories about the conict, we start by followingDurante
and Zhuravskaya (2018) and rst identify all stories with headlines containing the words Israel,
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Palestine, Gaza, West Bank, or Hamas, or any words with related roots. is
yields a total of 2,367 stories. To exclude stories unrelated to the conict, such as news about
Israeli or Palestinian politics, culture or tourism, we apply a word lter to the story headlines
and summaries. First, we include stories that have a headline referring both to the Israeli and
Palestinian references mentioned above. Second, we include stories with a headline containing
an Israeli reference and no Palestinian reference, but which have a summary containing any of the
Palestinian references. Analogously, we also include stories that have a Palestinian reference in
the headline and no Israeli reference, but which have a summary containing an Israeli reference.
We obtain a total of 1,747 stories about the conict using this method. We proceed to manually
code whether the news segments focus on Israeli violence, Palestinian violence or violence on
both sides.13 is gives us 314 news segments exclusively focusing on Israeli violence, 387 news
segments exclusively focusing on Palestinian violence, 530 segments mentioning violence on
both sides and 516 news segments which does not mention violence between the groups at all.
Appendix Table A3 gives ve examples of news stories and the application of the lter.
Our principal measure of conict news on a particular day is the average length of conict-
related news stories mentioning Israeli violence, Palestinian violence or violence on both sides
on NBC, ABC or CBS. To capture the overall newsworthiness of conict related stories, we divide
the total length of conict stories by the number of evening news broadcasts from the three
networks that are recorded on a particular day. Consequently, our measure is discounted if one or
two networks do not consider a particular conict related event newsworthy enough to include
in the evening news. Our measure, thus, captures how newsworthy these national networks
consider each conict related story on a particular day and provides a proxy for daily mass media
coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conict in the US.
13If the news segment mentions explicit violence from one side directed against the other, we classify this as
reporting on violence. If the segment mentions violence, but it is unclear who the aacker is, we code it as violence
from both sides.
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e boom part of Table 1 presents summary statistics of the dierent types of news cover-
age of the conict during the dierent conict periods. During the whole period, the conict was
covered on 16 percent of all days for an average of 40 seconds per news broadcast. Of course,
reporting is much more intense when the conict ares up. For example, the evening news fea-
tured the conict everyday during Operation Cast Lead and nine out of ten days during Operation
Pillar of Defense. However, during the three year period between these operations, the conict
was covered only once every twenty days on average.
We investigate the validity of the conict news measure by examining its association with
conict fatalities. Figure 2 plots the number of Israeli and Palestinian casualties together with
total conict news coverage, not split by aacker, for the entire sample period, excluding the ex-
traordinary intensive ghting in the GazaWars of 2008/2009 and July 2014. e gure shows that
our measure of conict news correlates strongly with conict fatalities, but also shows consider-
able variation not explained by conict fatalities. e gure also shows that, with the important
exception of the excluded short periods of intense ghting, day to day casualties are fewer in
the later period. While the period of the Second Intifada, roughly 2000 to 2005, exhibits substan-
tial turbulence and victims on both sides, the period aer the rst Gaza War is characterized by
longer periods of relative calm.
We formally test this relationship by regressing the length of violent conict news on each
side on three lags of fatalities from Israeli and Palestinian aacks using least squares with xed ef-
fects for year, month and day of the week. e results are shown in Table 2. Our primary interest
is the joint signicance of the lags, shown in the boom panel of the table. e table shows that
Palestinian victims from Israeli aacks signicantly increase reporting on Israeli violence and
reporting on violence from both sides, but has no eect on non-violent conict news. An Israeli
aack with 9 Palestinian fatal victims (corresponding to one standard deviation) increases cov-
erage of exclusive Israeli violence by 24 seconds. e eect on exclusive reporting on Palestinian
violence is predominantly negative but only signicant at the 10% level. Turning to the eect of
Israeli victims from Palestinian aacks, we see a strong, signicant and positive eect on exclu-
sive reporting of Palestinian violence and violence on both sides and strong, negative signicant
eects on exclusive reporting of Israeli violence and non-violent conict news. A Palestinian at-
tack with 1.2 Israeli fatal victims (corresponding to one standard deviation) increases coverage of
exclusive Palestinian violence by 8.5 seconds. e signicance of the individual coecients from
both Israeli and Palestinian aacks indicate that aacks today and yesterday are particularly im-
portant for conict news coverage.
e percentage of explained variation ranges from 7% for non-violent reporting to 21-37%
for violent reporting. We examine how much of the conict news reporting is driven by fatal
aacks by comparing the share of explained variation to a set of benchmark models, which only
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Table 2: Eect of Fatal Aacks on Conict News Content









Victims Israeli aacks day…
(t) 0.009∗∗ -0.001 0.007 0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000)
(t - 1) 0.010∗ -0.001 0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
(t - 2) -0.000 0.001 0.009 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
Victims Palestinian aacks day…
(t) -0.024∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.012) (0.020) (0.003)
(t - 1) -0.001 0.049∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.008) (0.013) (0.017) (0.008)
(t - 2) 0.008 0.012∗ 0.068∗ -0.002
(0.012) (0.006) (0.033) (0.005)
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes
News pressure Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5698 5698 5698 5698
Mean dependent var. 0.054 0.038 0.089 0.064
Sd. of dependent var. 0.354 0.281 0.558 0.337
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
F-test Israeli aacks 0.000 0.068 0.006 0.369
F-test Palestinian aacks 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.002
R-squared 0.216 0.366 0.268 0.071
R-squared excluding aacks 0.048 0.089 0.048 0.068
Note: e outcome variables are the length of conict news in minutes categorized by
content. Independent variables are the number of fatal victims from Israeli and Pales-
tinian aacks, respectively. e corresponding F-test refers to the p-value of the re-
stricted model where the eects of aacks on each side are null. R-squared excluding
aacks refers to the R-squared from models where the outcome variables are regressed
on the controls and xed eects. All models control for year, calendar-month and week-
day xed eects, and a set of controls for holidays and events which are presented in
Section 4.1. All models are estimated using OLS, with Newey West standard errors al-
lowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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include xed eects and control variables. For reporting on Israeli violence we nd that the
share of explained variation increases by 16 percentage points, for Palestinian violence by 27
points and for violence on both sides by 22 points. For non-violent reporting, the dierence is
a mere 0.03 points. us, for reporting on violence, the share of explained variation more than
quadruples when we add conict fatalities to the model, further strengthening the validity of our
measurements.
Although our models account for a substantial part of the variation in conict news, most
of the variation remains unexplained. Importantly, this reects that our conict news measures
capture more information than a simple fatality count. First, our measure of conict news likely
reects the newsworthiness of a particular aack, whichwill not be perfectly captured by the total
number of fatalities. For example, certain aacks, such as suicide bombings or aacks with many
civilian victims, may be particularly controversial and considered more newsworthy. Second,
U.S. mass media covers events in the conict not reected in the number of fatalities, such as
rioting and non-fatal rocket aacks. In sum, we conclude that our measures of conict news are
meaningfully associated with fatal aacks in the conict.
4 Empirical Strategy
We examine how conict intensity aects hate crime using two types of data described in detail
in the preceding sections. e rst is based on conict fatalities. Our data allows us to distin-
guish between the identity of the aacker and the victims and we use this to examine through
what mechanism conict fatalities trigger hate crime. We hypothesize that fatal aggression gen-
erates more hate crime towards the ethno-religious group associated with the aacker. While the
salience of the conict should increase in the aermath of an aack, animosity should primarily
increase toward the aacker. To test this, we estimate the following equation:










Pal Attτ + ωt + δyt + ηmt + ρdt + ϵtk (1)
where Hatetk is the number of hate crimes towards group k (either Jews or Muslims) on day t .
αkI is the eect of the number of Palestinian fatal victims from an Israeli aack day t and t − 1. α
k
P
estimates the analogous eect of aacks from the Palestinian side. In our main specication, we
focus on the eects of aacks today and yesterday, since the media analysis, presented in Table
5, suggests that fatal aacks primarily increase conict news today and yesterday. eoretically,
including one lag of fatalities allows enough time for potential oenders to be reached by, and
react to, information about the event. e six-to-ten hour time dierence between the U.S. and
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Israel implies that if a signicant event occurs in Israel shortly aer midnight, for example at 1
a.m., this would be 3(6) p.m. on the U.S. west(east) coast the previous day. Since we do not have
information on the time of the day that aacks or hate crimes occur, but only the dates on which
they occur, this makes it possible for both media outlets and individuals to react to events in the
Middle East the day before they are reported to happen. Due to the same reason, the time dif-
ference enables a response in the U.S. on the same calendar date as the conict event. However,
we present various alternative lag structures in the Appendix. ωt denotes a vector of control
variables, which we explain in detail in Section 4.1. We include xed eects for year, δyt , calendar
month, ηmt , and day of the week, ρdt . is is to ensure that the relationship between hate crimes
and conict intensity is not driven by time trends or seasonality. is would for example be the
case if conict intensity and propensity to report hate crimes in the U.S. increased during our
period for unrelated reasons, or if both aacks and hate crimes are more common during certain
calendar months or weekdays. ϵt is the idiosyncratic error term. As our dependent variable is
count data and exhibit overdispersion, we use a maximum likelihood negative binomial model in
all our main specications. To account for serial correlation of hate crime levels and conict fatal-
ities we estimate standard errors using the Newey-West estimator, allowing for autocorrelation
of up to 7 lags.
Second, we estimate the eect of the conict on hate crimes using U.S. mass media coverage
of the conict categorized by the aacker. Specically, we estimate the following equation:
















+ ωt + δyt + ηmt + ρdt + ϵtk
(2)
where βkI denotes the eect of the average length of conict news focusing day t and t − 1 ex-
clusively on Israeli violence, βkP the eect of conict news focusing exclusively on Palestinian
violence and βkIP the eect of news reporting on violence from both sides. e dependent vari-
able, the xed eects and the control variables are the same as in Equation 1 and we also use a
negative binomial model with Newey-West standard errors.
We test whether the eects of aacks and news are asymmetric, meaning that primarily the
ethno-religious group associated with the aacker becomes a target of hate crime, by comparing
the eects both across the aacker, holding the hate crime category constant, and across hate
crimes, holding the aacker constant. Specically, for hate crime k , we test whether αkI = α
k
P
and βkI = β
k
P . is addresses whether, for example, Israeli and Palestinian aacks have the same





addresses whether, for example, Israeli aacks have the same eect on both anti-Jewish and anti-
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Islamic hate crimes. To test eects across hate crimes categories, we estimate Equation 1 and 2,
respectively, as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions across the two hate crime categories.
Several important dierences between the conict fatalities and the conict news measures
are worth stressing. First, the context of the aack, not captured by the number of fatalities,
may aect both reporting and any behavioral response. Our media variables capture the general
newsworthiness of conict events to a U.S. audience beer than a fatality count. Second, conict
events are unlikely to trigger hate crimes if potential oenders never learn about them. emedia
variable is beer at capturing the degree towhich U.S. audiences are exposed to information about
the conict and how this information is framed. For instance, although there may be fatalities on
both sides on a specic day, the individual news segment may focus on fatalities from one side.
ird, the media measures capture aacks and violence that are not fatal, such as rocket aacks,
failed suicide bombings and kidnappings. Fourth, by categorizing conict news according to
which side is the aacker, we also get a measure of non-violent conict news, which we use
to test the eect of general conict salience on hate crimes. Naturally, we cannot disentangle
the eect of conict news from the conict events themselves. Nor can we exclude that conict
information reaches potential perpetrators through other information channels. For example,
such individuals may receive information on events in the conict through alternative media
sources focusing on the middle east (e.g. Al Jazeera), social media, or personal contacts in the
region.
4.1 Controls
e identifying assumption underlying a causal interpretation of the estimates is that the timing
of fatal aacks and conict news are exogenouswith regards to the timing of anti-Jewish and anti-
Islamic hate crime in the U.S. To control for potential omied variables that may aect both hate
crimes and the timing of aacks, we include in all specications controls for religious holidays,
U.S. news pressure and U.S. political events that drive it, as well as federal holidays.
Religious and national holidaysmay aect both the likelihood of Israeli and Palestinian aacks
and the salience of group membership among Jews and Muslims in the U.S., which in turn may
aect the level of hate crime. is can lead to a spurious correlation between conict events and
anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime. We therefore include a set of controls for Jewish, Israeli,
Islamic and Palestinian holidays and events, listed in Appendix Table A4.
Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018) show that Israeli aacks are more likely to occur the day
before U.S. news is dominated by important predictable events. e increased news pressure
caused by the predictable events decreases the media coverage of the conict. eir analysis
suggests that the strategic timing applies to aacks that bear risk for civilian casualties in order
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to minimize next-day coverage. Failure to account for the strategic timing could generate both an
upward and a downward bias. We consider three examples of strategic timing. First, consider the
case where aacks are timed to political events in the U.S., which have no eect on hate crimes.
is decreases the probability that potential hate crime oenders are exposed to information
about aacks, and would reduce but not bias the estimated eect of conict fatalities on hate
crimes, while our estimated eect of conict news would be unaected. Second, consider the
same strategic timing, but where the predictable political events are associated with increased
levels of hate crime. In this case, the estimated eect of fatalities on hate crime could be biased
either upwards or downwards, while the estimated eect of conict news on hate crime will
be biased upwards. ird, consider again the same strategic timing, but where the predictable
events are associated with lower levels of hate crime. In this case, the estimated eect of both
fatalities and conict news on hate crime will be biased downwards. To address this concern,
we control for major political and sports events which are ex ante predictable, generate higher
levels of news pressure, and are themselves unlikely to trigger news reporting on the conict.
e events included are listed in Appendix Table A4.14
To further address this concern, we directly control for U.S. news pressure today and tomor-
row. We construct the news pressure variable following Eisensee and Strömberg (2007), using the
length of news stories unrelated to the Israeli-Palestinian conict in the evening news broadcasts
on ABC, CBS and NBC.e time constraint given by the xed 30 minute time slot on these broad-
casts allows us to measure the presence of newsworthy events. e more important an event is
considered, the longer the news segment will be and the earlier in the broadcast the story will
occur. We dene News pressure as the time alloed to the top three news stories unrelated to
Israel or Palestine in the evening newscast on ABC, CBS and NBC.15
Despite the above controls, conict events may coincide with days or periods in which the
level of hate crime in the U.S. is systematically dierent. For example, aacks may be timed to
Christian or Federal holidays if holidays aect news consumption levels or the propensity for
politicians to immediately react to controversial aacks. If such holidays are associated with
systematically dierent levels of hate crimes, this will bias the estimates. We therefore control
for a set of Christian and Federal holidays, as well as the yearly 9/11 anniversary. ese holidays
14To select the predictable political events for our period, we use historical snapshots in the digital archive Way-
back Machine (hp://www.archive.com/web/; accessed November 11, 2018) of a forward-looking U.S. political cal-
endar (hp://www.politics1.com/calendar.htm; accessed November 11, 2018.). We also collected dates of major sport
events, both in the U.S. and the World. We then regress our news pressure variable on dummies for these events
and use the results to select a net list of events that drive news pressure in the US. is method broadly follows the
method used by Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018) and unsurprisingly leads to a similar set of events in our sample.
We refer the reader to their paper for further details on this selection method.
15If there are news stories related to either Israel or Palestine, we dene news pressure as the time alloed to the
top three stories unrelated to Israel and Palestine, divided by the time alloed to all other stories unrelated to Israel
and Palestine. is is then multiplied by the length of the broadcast to get news pressure in minutes.
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and events are listed in Appendix Table A4.
5 Does the Israeli-Palestinian Conict Trigger Hate Crime?
5.1 e Eect of Conict Fatalities on Hate Crime
We present the main results of estimating Equation 1 in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 regress hate
crimes on the number of victims from Israeli and Palestinian aacks. e table shows that Israeli
aacks trigger anti-Jewish hate crimes and Palestinian aacks trigger anti-Muslim hate crimes,
but that there are no eects of Israeli aacks on anti-Muslim hate crimes nor Palestinian aacks
on anti-Jewish hate crimes. e average fatal aack, corresponding to 6.61 victims from Israeli
aacks and 3.22 victims from Palestinian aacks, increases the number of expected hate crimes
towards Jews by 1.4% and towards Muslims by 8.7%.16
16Since the negative binomial model uses a log-link function, the coecients can be interpreted as exp(β)% change
in the outcome variable.
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Table 3: e Eect of Conict Fatalities on Hate Crime













Victims Israeli aacks (t and t-1) 0.002
∗∗ 0.001 0.029∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010)
Victims Palestinian aacks (t and t-1) 0.005 0.026
∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.015)
Top 1% Israeli aacks (t and t-1)
(>40 victims, 57 dates)
0.351∗∗∗ 0.269 3.502∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.209) (0.299)
Top 1% Palestinian aacks (t and t-1)
(>10 victims, 46 dates)
0.056 0.440∗∗ 1.729∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.157) (0.209)
Smaller Israeli aacks (t and t-1)
(1-40 victims, 2635 dates)
0.032 0.047 0.651∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.051) (0.125)
Smaller Palestinian aacks (t and t-1)
(1-10 victims, 639 dates)
0.032 0.066 0.623∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.075) (0.121)
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5763 5763 5765 5765 5698 5700
Mean dependent var. 2.366 0.452 2.368 0.452 0.246 0.247
Sd. of dependent var. 1.843 0.732 1.845 0.732 0.894 0.894
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
Pseudo R-squared 0.031 0.051 0.032 0.051 0.224 0.231
P-value α J ewI = α
I sl
I 0.328 0.578
P-value α J ewP = α
I sl
P 0.023 0.013
P-value αkI = α
k
P 0.527 0.008 0.020 0.549
Note: e dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1,3) and Muslims
(columns 2,4), and the length of conict news reporting (column 5-6). e independent variables are the total
number of victims the past two days from Israeli aacks and Palestinian aacks (columns 1, 2 and 5) and
two mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating smaller and top percentile Israeli and Palestinian aacks
(columns 3,4 and 6). All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday xed eects, as well as a set of
controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. All models are estimated
using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey-West standard errors allowing for auto-
correlation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis. e last three rows present the p-values of a test for
equality between either the eects of Israeli or Palestinian (large) aacks on anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate
crimes estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions, or a test for equivalence between the coecients for
Israeli and Palestinian aacks within the same model.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Figure 3: e Eect of Conict Fatalities on Hate Crime
Note: e gures show coecient estimates on anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes corresponding to columns 1-4 in Table 3 in addition to
estimates on anti-Black and anti-Hispanic hate crimes included for comparison.
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Columns 3 and 4 examine whether large aacks are driving the results, by regressing hate
crime on two sets of dummies indicating whether an aack is below or in the top percentile of
the distribution of aacks for each side, including days with no aacks. By doing so, we relax
the assumption of a linear eect of fatalities on hate crimes. is yields an indicator for 57 dates
with more than 40 fatal Palestinian victims and 46 dates with more than 10 Israeli victims. We
construct the dummies based on the distribution of aacks from each side, since, as we show
in Table 2, the eect of conict fatalities on conict news diers between the aackers. e
reference category is days with no aacks. e results follow the same paern. Israeli aacks
trigger hate crimes against Jews and Palestinian aacks trigger hate crimes against Muslims.
However, we only nd signicant eects for large aacks. A large Israeli aack increases anti-
Jewish hate crimes by 35% and a large Palestinian aack increases anti-Muslim hate crimes by
44%. e eect of smaller aacks is not only insignicant, but the point estimates are 10 times
smaller for Israeli aacks and 6 times smaller for Palestinian aacks. In Appendix Table A6, we
show that the results are virtually the same when we partition the dummy indicating smaller
aacks into additionally two categories.
To alleviate concerns that the eect of conict fatalities on anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate
crimes are spurious and, for example, induced by seasonal variation not captured by the xed
eects or our controls, we use two placebo hate crime categories as dependent variables: anti-
Black and anti-Hispanic hate crimes. We present these results, using the same specication as
in Table 3, in Figure 3 for comparison as well as in Appendix Table A7. e results show no
signicant eects of conict fatalities on anti-Black and anti-Hispanic hate crime. In addition,
the point estimates are much smaller compared to the eects we nd for anti-Jewish and anti-
Islamic hate crimes. is suggests that our main results are not driven by seasonality eects or
time trends in reporting of hate crimes, strengthening the causal interpretation of the results.
Appendix Table A5 shows results from Equation 1 when using as the independent variables
the number of conict fatalities from either Palestinian or Israeli aacks on day t , and then grad-
ually introducing up to ve lags of the independent variables. e results show that anti-Jewish
hate crimes are primarily triggered by victims from Israeli aacks and anti-Islamic hate crimes
seem to be triggered by fatalities from both sides. is relationship rst appears with the inclu-
sion of the rst lag of fatalities, and is robust to the inclusion of more lags as is evident from their
joint signicance.
When testing against the null, we nd an asymmetric paern in the eect of fatal aacks
on hate crimes. Israeli aacks increase anti-Jewish hate crimes and Palestinian aacks increase
anti-Islamic hate crimes. e boom three rows of Table 3 present p-values for statistical tests
of equivalence between coecients between aackers and within hate crime categories. We rst
estimate the models in column 1 and 2 using seemingly unrelated regression and test for equiv-
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alence of the eect of Israeli and Palestinian aacks, respectively, across hate crime categories.
We can reject the null of no dierence in the eect of Palestinian aacks on anti-Jewish and anti-
Islamic hate crimes, although we cannot reject the null for Israeli aacks. is result holds when
we perform the same test for our non-linear specications in column 3 and 4. In the last row, we
test for the equivalence between the eects of victims from Israeli and Palestinian aacks within
hate crime categories. For our linear specication, we can reject the null of no dierence between
Israeli and Palestinian aacks on anti-Islamic hate crimes, but not for anti-Jewish hate crimes.
When we perform the same test for our non-linear specications, we nd that the eect on anti-
Jewish hate crimes of large Israeli aacks are signicantly larger than the (insignicant) eect of
Palestinian aacks, whereas we cannot reject the null of no dierence between the corresponding
coecients on anti-Islamic hate crimes. ese results, in sum, suggest that the identity of the at-
tacker maers for conict spillovers in the U.S. Yet, despite that we do not nd a signicant eect
of Israeli aacks on anti-Islamic hate crimes when testing against the null, we are cautious to rule
out such an eect, especially in light of the results from the seemingly unrelated regressions. Our
failure to reject the null of equivalent eects of Israeli aacks might reect conict dynamics that
escape our statistical model. Specically, existing research shows that the IDF systematically re-
taliates fatal Palestinian aacks, while Palestinians aack more randomly (Jaeger and Paserman,
2008 but see also Haushofer, Biletzki and Kanwisher, 2010). us, it is possible that Israeli aacks
are correlated with events in the conict that trigger anti-Islamic violence, not captured by our
fatalities data, which would bias the eect of Israeli aacks on anti-Islamic hate crime upwards.
Finally, we examine how conict fatalities aect the length of conict news reporting. We
show these results in columns 5 and 6 in Table 3. We nd strong and signicant eects for both
Israeli and Palestinian aacks for both types of measures. As expected, large aacks result in
much longer news reporting compared to smaller aacks. An Israeli aack in the top percentile
increases conict news reporting by approximately 3.5 minutes, while the analogous Palestinian
aack increases conict news reporting by 1.7 minutes. ese relative magnitudes are inverted
when we look to the eect of the linear measure of fatalities, where one fatality from a Palestinian
aack leads to more news reporting compared to a fatality from an Israeli aack. is may reect
that Palestinian aacks are less common and, therefore, deemed more newsworthy. In contrast to
the eect on hate crimes, we nd signicant eects of smaller aacks on conict news reporting.
e next section turns to the eects of conict news reporting on hate crime.
5.2 e Eect of Conict News on Hate Crime
is section examines how hate crimes change aer U.S. mass media coverage of violence from
each party in the conict. We estimate Equation 2 using as the independent variables the length
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of conict coverage, today and yesterday, on Israeli violence, Palestinian violence, and violence
from both sides respectively.
Table 4: News on the Israeli-Palestinian Conict and Hate Crimes













Both sides aacking 0.034
∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.008) (0.019)
Palestinian aacks 0.016 0.112
∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.033)




Both sides aacking 0.309
∗∗∗ 0.139
(0.091) (0.212)
Palestinian aacks 0.089 0.381
∗
(0.083) (0.156)
Boom 99% conict news, today and yesterday, covering …
Israeli aacks -0.028 0.040(0.039) (0.098)
Both sides aacking 0.096
∗ 0.104
(0.041) (0.091)
Palestinian aacks -0.004 0.128(0.048) (0.108)
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5633 5633 5633 5633
Mean dependent var. 2.369 0.449 2.369 0.449
Sd. of dependent var. 1.843 0.729 1.843 0.729
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
Pseudo R-squared 0.033 0.050 0.033 0.050
P-value β J ewI = β
I sl
I 0.834 0.750
P-value β J ewP = β
I sl
P 0.004 0.109
P-value βkI = β
k
P 0.237 0.039 0.199 0.367
Note: e dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1 and 3) and Muslims (columns 2 and 4). e in-
dependent variables are our measures of the length of conict-related news aggregated for day t and t-1 and two mutually exclusive dummy
variables indicating days with less or top percentile news reporting within each type of reporting. All models control for year, calendar-month
and weekday xed eects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. e last three
rows present the p-values of a test for equality between either the eects of (extensive) reporting on Israeli or Palestinian aacks on anti-Jewish
and anti-Islamic hate crimes estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions, or a test for equivalence between the coecients for reporting
on Israeli and Palestinian aacks within the same model. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with
Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Figure 4: News on the Israeli-Palestinian Conict and Hate Crimes
Note: e le gure shows coecient estimates corresponding to column 1 and 2 in Table 3, with estimates on anti-Black and anti-Hispanic hate
crimes included for comparison. e right gure analogously presents the coecient estimates from column 3 and 4 from the same table.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 regress anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes on the length
of conict news, today and yesterday, covering either Israeli aacks, both sides aacking, or
Palestinian aacks. Column 1 shows that anti-Jewish hate crimes are triggered by news cover-
age involving Israeli aacks, regardless of whether the coverage also covers Palestinian violence
towards Israel. is is indicated by the signicant eects of coverage of Israeli aacks and both
sides aacking. e expected number of anti-Jewish hate crimes increases by 4.2% with one ad-
ditional minute of conict news reporting focusing exclusively on Israeli aacks, and by 3.4%
with the analogous increase of reporting on aacks from both sides. e eect of news focusing
exclusively on Palestinian aacks is much smaller and we cannot reject the null of no eect. In
Column 2, we see no indication that coverage involving Israeli violence is triggering hate crimes
towards Muslims, but rather a large and signicant eect on Anti-Muslim hate crimes of news
on Palestinian aacks. One additional minute of news reporting on Palestinian aacks increases
expected anti-Islamic hate crimes by 11.8%.
Similar to our analysis of conict fatalities, we relax the linearity assumption by regressing
hate crimes on two dummies for each type of coverage, indicating whether the conict news
reporting is in or below the top percentile. e results show the same paern as in column 1
and 2. On days when news reporting is in the top percentile of the distribution of reporting on
Israeli aacks or both sides aacking, respectively, anti-Jewish hate crime is expected to increase
by 26% and 36% respectively. e eect of extensive reporting on Palestinian aacks is much
smaller and again, we cannot reject the null of no eect. Column 4 mirrors the results in Column
2, showing that Anti-Muslim are triggered by extensive reporting on Palestinian aacks. e
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coecient suggests that extensive reporting on Palestinian aacks is expected to increase anti-
Muslim hate crimes by 46%. Looking at the eects of news reporting below the top percentile, we
see that the point estimates are much smaller and for the most part insignicant. e exception
is the coecient for coverage in boom 99 percentiles of both sides aacking, which shows a
signicant eect on anti-Jewish hate crimes. In Appendix Table A10, we show that these results
are robust to spliing the dummy for news reporting below the top percentile into one additional
category. Figure 4 and Appendix Table A9 once again show that anti-Black and anti-Hispanic
hate crimes are not aected by conict news reporting.
Similar to our analysis of conict fatalities, Appendix Table A8 presents the results of re-
gressing the number of hate crimes on day t on the length of conict reporting the same day, and
subsequent columns gradually introduces one, two and ve lags of the independent variables.
Column 1 indicates that news on Israeli aacks or both sides aacking triggers hate crime to-
wards Jews the same day. Gradually adding lags reduces precision of individual estimates, but
the F-test shows that the lags for coverage of both sides aacking are statistically dierent from
zero. Columns 5-8 shows similar results for anti-Muslim hate crimes. Coverage of Palestinian
aacks seem to primarily trigger hate crimes the same day.
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that general salience of the conict in U.S. mass media is
not sucient to trigger hate crimes against American Jews or Muslims. Instead, it depends on if
the coverage is focusing on Israeli or Palestinian violence. As in our analysis of conict fatalities,
we formally test the equivalence of the coecients across and within hate crime categories. e
p-values for these tests are reported in the boom panel of Table 4. Comparing across hate
crime categories, we can reject the null of no dierence between the eects of length of coverage
on Palestinian aacks, but not for coverage involving Israeli aacks or any of the coecients
on top 1% news reporting. ese results are, thus, consistent with the eect of fatal aacks.
Comparing coecients within models and hate crime categories, we can reject the null of no
dierence between the eects on anti-Islamic hate crimes between the length of coverage of
Israeli aacks and Palestinian aacks, but not for anti-Jewish hate crimes. For the top percentile
news coverage, we cannot reject the null for either hate crime category.
5.3 Heterogeneity of Media Reporting and Hate Crimes
is section uses our conict news measures to gain further insights on why the conict in-
creases hate crimes and on the generalizability and importance of our ndings. Specically, we
address four additional questions. First, do smaller aacks aect hate crimes? Second, do our nd-
ings generalize to other conicts? ird, does non-violent conict reporting aect hate crimes?
Fourth, does the conict aect violent as well as non-violent hate crime?
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We rst examine if smaller aacks, that still receive media coverage, induce hate crimes.
In column 1 and 3 of Table 5, we regress anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime on our linear
measures of conict reporting but exclude days that have had an aack in the top percentile from
either side sometime during the past week. We see that the eects of Israeli violence and violence
from both sides on anti-Jewish hate crimes remain and actually increases slightly compared to
the estimates in Table 4. e same is true for the eect of Palestinian violence on anti-Islamic
hate crimes. is suggests that aacks below the top percentile trigger hate crimes, conditional
on that they are covered in news.
Second, we proceed to examine if the eect of news on conict violence can be generalized to
other conicts. Specically, our news data contain reporting on the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war. e
war, primarily between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist political party and militant group,
took place during approximately one month in 2006, and is estimated to have resulted in 1,200-
1,300 Lebanese casualties and 165 Israeli casualties. Columns 2 and 4 present the eects of the
Israel-Lebanon war news coverage on anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes. e intensity and
brevity of the war makes it dicult to disentangle which side is the predominant aggressor in the
individual news segments, and we therefore assess the aggregate linear eect of reporting in min-
utes averaged across the three news networks on both anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes.
e results show that media coverage of the Israel-Lebanon conict increases both anti-Jewish
hate crimes and anti-Islamic hate crimes. e eect on anti-Islamic hate crimes is particularly
strong. One additional minute of reporting on the Israel-Lebanon conict is expected to increase
anti-Islamic hate crimes by 2.1% and anti-Jewish hate crimes by 1.5%. is shows that the eect of
conict spillover we identify for the Israeli-Palestinian conict extends to the broader Arab-Israeli
conict.
ird, we address whether non-violent conict news may also aect hate crimes. Our main
results show that aacks and conict reporting on violence primarily triggers hate crimes against
the ethno-religious group associated with the aacker. is suggests that general conict news
have lile eect on hate crime. We test this directly by examining the eect of non-violent conict
news, which measures the coverage of the Israeli-Palestine conict excluding all reporting on
violence. e results are presented in Column 2 and 4 of Table 5. We nd no evidence that non-
violent news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conict induces anti-Jewish or anti-Islamic hate
crime. None of the individual coecients are signicant and both point estimates are small and
negative. us, it appears that general conict salience does not aect hate crimes, even though
our measurement of non-violent conict news, in addition to reporting on peace talks and high-
level political meetings, contains reporting on controversial events like selement expansions or
policy decisions aecting the conict.
Lastly, we show that the conict does not only trigger less severe forms of hate crimes, such
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Table 5: Eects of Dierent News Content on Hate Crime









Israeli Violence (t and t-1) 0.048∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.026 0.038
(0.020) (0.016) (0.038) (0.027)
Both Violence (t and t-1) 0.055∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.080 0.013
(0.021) (0.008) (0.045) (0.019)
Palestinian Violence (t and t-1) -0.010 0.017 0.132∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.018) (0.059) (0.033)
Non-Violent Conict News (t and t-1) -0.013 -0.000
(0.019) (0.037)
Israel-Lebanon Violent Conict News (t and t-1) 0.015∗ 0.021∗
(0.007) (0.009)
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5372 5633 5372 5633
Mean dependent var. 2.355 2.369 0.444 0.449
Sd. of dependent var. 1.846 1.843 0.725 0.729
Excluding week of large aacks Yes - Yes -
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.034 0.033 0.052 0.050
e dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1-2)
and Muslims (columns 3-4). e rst four independent variables are our measures of the
length of conict-related news aggregated for day t and t-1, split into type of reporting. e
last measure only includes reporting on violence in the Israel-Lebanon conict. Columns
1 and 3 estimate the model on a sample that excludes days with a top percentile aack in
the previous week. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday xed eects
and are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West
standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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as property crimes and vandalism, but increases violence toward Jews and Muslims in the U.S.
Table 6 estimates the eect of fatal aacks and news coverage on violent and non-violent hate
crimes respectively. Columns 1-2 show that Israeli aacks trigger both violent and non-violent
anti-Jewish hate crimes. Columns 3-4 show the results for anti-Islamic hate crimes. Palestinian
aacks trigger violent anti-Muslim hate crimes, while the coecient for non-violent hate crimes
is smaller, less precise and insignicant. Columns 5-8 of Table 6 show the analogous results
for days with the most extensive news coverage. Column 5-6 show that news coverage of Is-
raeli violence or violence on both sides trigger both violent and non-violent anti-Jewish hate
crimes. However, the eect of Israeli violence on non-violent anti-Jewish hate crimes is not sig-
nicant. Reporting on Palestinian violence has a signicant eect on violent anti-Muslim hate
crimes while the eect on non-violent anti-Muslim hate crimes is only signicant at the 10% level.
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Table 6: Eect on Violent and Non-Violent Hate Crimes

























Number of victims, today and yesterday, from…
Israeli aacks 0.002
∗ 0.001∗ 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Palestinian aacks 0.007 0.004 0.036
∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.015)
Length of conict news, today and yesterday, covering…
Israeli aacks 0.050
∗ 0.037 0.051 0.010
(0.022) (0.020) (0.038) (0.050)
Both sides aacking 0.053
∗∗∗ 0.022∗ -0.003 0.037
(0.011) (0.009) (0.027) (0.028)
Palestinian aacks 0.013 0.017 0.119
∗∗ 0.100
(0.032) (0.025) (0.040) (0.056)
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5763 5763 5763 5763 5633 5633 5633 5633
Mean dependent var. 0.702 1.664 0.299 0.153 0.706 1.663 0.297 0.152
Sd. of dependent var. 0.930 1.529 0.580 0.415 0.933 1.528 0.578 0.413
Model NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML
Pseudo R-squared 0.041 0.024 0.054 0.047 0.041 0.025 0.052 0.047
Notes: e dependent variables are violent (columns 1 and 5) and non-violent (columns 2 and 6) anti-Jewish hate crimes and violent (columns 3 and 7) and non-
violent (columns 4 and 8) anti-Muslim hate crimes. e independent variables are dummies for days with top percentile Israeli aacks, top percentile Palestinian
aacks or top percentile conict news reporting.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
is section examines the sensitivity of our results. Specically, we focus on the sensitivity of
the eect of top percentile aacks and news reporting. e overall ndings are unaected by the
choice of controls and are not driven by specic conict periods, U.S. states, temporal variation
in police agencies’ participation in the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, or the choice of model
specication or lag structure. ey are also relatively unaected when adding future aacks and
reporting to the model.
First, Appendix Table A11 estimates the eect of conict news and conict fatalities on hate
crime while adding one set of temporal controls at a time. e table shows that the ndings are
not dependent on including a specic set of control variables.
Second, Appendix Table A12 splits the sample into four particularly intense conict peri-
ods and estimates the eect of conict fatalities and conict news today and yesterday on hate
crime. We exclude the conict periods one at a time. is addresses whether our ndings are
predominantly driven by specic conict periods and whether the eect sizes dier across con-
ict periods. e conict periods are the Second Intifada, Operation Cast Lead, Operation Pillar
of Defense and Operation Protective Edge, further described in Section 3.2. Panel A shows the
eect of the largest Israeli and Palestinian aacks on anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes.
Both the eects of Israeli and Palestinian aacks remain signicant when we drop the conict
periods, but there is some variation in the point estimates. For instance, excluding operation Pro-
tective Edge, accounting for 25% of all fatalities from Israeli aacks, reduces the point estimates
and precision somewhat. Similarly, dropping the Second Intifada, accounting for 75% of fatali-
ties from Palestinian aacks, decreases the precision of the estimate of Palestinian aacks but
increases the point estimates substantially. Panel B shows the eect of top percentile reporting
on violence from Israeli, Palestinian or both sides respectively. ese results are slightly more
sensitive to excluding the Second Intifada compared to the eect of fatalities, but the eects are
largely unaected by dropping the other conict periods. is is perhaps not surprising, since the
Second Intifada accounts for 62% of all conict coverage. Dropping the Second Intifada strongly
reduces the precision for all types of news reporting that are signicant in the full sample and also
reduces the point estimates for Israeli violence and violence from both sides. In contrast, the coef-
cient estimate for reporting on violence from both sides increases substantially for anti-Islamic
hate crimes. We speculate that this might reect the fact that most of the larger aacks from
the Palestinian side occur during this period, and that aacks aer occur mostly in conjunction
with Israeli aacks. In Appendix Table A13, we provide an alternative measure of conict news
by collapsing the violent conict reporting variables into one variable, and regress hate crimes
on days with top percentile overall reporting on conict violence. We see a consistent eect of
violent conict reporting on both anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes, although the eects
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on anti-Islamic hate crimes are only signicant at the ten percent level when dropping either the
Second Intifada or Protective Edge. In sum, the results from Appendix Tables A12 and A13 show
that the main results are not driven by a single conict period in our sample, but suggest that
there may be heterogeneity in the eect sizes across conict periods.
ird, we further probe the sensitivity of the results by dropping certain U.S. states from the
sample. Appendix Table A14 estimates our main models of conict fatalities and conict news on
hate crime, while excluding hate crimes in California, New York or New Jersey from the sample.
ese three states have the highest number of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes in our
sample. Panel A shows that the eect of Israeli aacks on anti-Jewish hate crime, and Palestinian
aacks on anti-Islamic hate crime, is robust to excluding hate crimes occurring in these states.
Panel B shows the analogous results for the eect of top conict news reporting. For anti-Jewish
hate crimes, the estimates for reporting on Israeli violence are smaller and turns insignicant
when dropping either California or New York, but the eect of reporting on violence from both
sides remains signicant. e results for anti-Islamic hate crimes are less sensitive to dropping
either of these states.
Fourth, Appendix Table A15 estimates our main specications using ordinary least squares
on the number of hate crimes and log(+1) of the number of hate crimes respectively, as well
as probit regression on an indicator variable for the incidence of anti-Jewish or anti-Islamic hate
crime on that day. Presented in the columns 3-6 in both panels, we see that both OLSmodels show
similar results as our main results, which are shown in the rst two columns for comparison. In
the last two columns of both panels we present the results from the probit regression with a
collapsed dependent variable. For anti-Jewish hate crimes, estimates are no longer signicant for
either aacks or reporting. ese insignicant results appear to be driven by a ceiling eect, as
approximately 86% of our days in the sample have at least one reported incidence of anti-Jewish
hate crime. In the last column, we nd a signicant eect of large Palestinian aacks on anti-
Islamic hate crimes and a smaller and non-signicant eect of coverage of Palestinian aacks.
Fih, Appendix Table A16 estimates our main linear specications using either weekly level
data (columns 1-4) or daily level data but with our independent variables aggregated the past 3
days instead of 2 days (columns 5-8). e table shows largely the same results as in our main es-
timates. Conict news is consistently increasing both anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hate crimes.
Israeli aacks primarily seem to trigger anti-Jewish hate crimes, while Palestinian aacks primar-
ily seem to trigger anti-Muslim hate crimes, although the coecient estimate decreases somewhat
and becomes insignicant in the daily level data with 3 day aggregates.
Sixth, an additional threat to the identication strategy would be if agencies select in and out
of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program in response to events in the conict. Appendix Table
A17 replicates our main specications using only data from agencies that do not drop out of the
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program once they start participating. Our ndings replicate on this sample, and are, if anything,
more pronounced compared to the full sample.
Seventh, Appendix Tables A18-A19 present how our main results are aected when including
future large aacks in the model. e conict dynamics, with its retaliatory paern and extreme
periods of intense violence, is likely to make future fatalities outcomes of our treatment variable.
e conict events that make the conict are up and generate more fatal aacks may also be the
events that trigger hate crimes in the US. In such a case, the number of fatalities a particular aack
today generates in the following days might be a reasonable proxy for the contentiousness of the
aack, or the intensity of the conict today, as compared to the number of fatalities generated
today. If so, we would expect future large aacks to also predict hate crimes today, or at least
aenuate the eect of previous aacks when including them in the model. However, as Appendix
Tables A18-A19 demonstrates, our main estimates of the eect of large aacks and extensive
media reporting is somewhat smaller but relatively unaected by adding future aacks in the
model.
5.5 Retaliatory Motive or Conict Salience?
e overall results are consistent with the interpretation that hate crimes in our seing are driven
by some kind of retaliatory motive among perpetrators. Since we do not have data on who the
perpetrators are and, in addition, since oender motives are not observable but can only be in-
ferred, we cannot completely rule out all alternative explanations for why the conict triggers
hate crimes. However, several of our results are inconsistent with alternative explanations. First,
the eect does not seem to be driven by particularly violent events in general, or news reporting
on them, as we nd no eect on other hate crimes categories. Second, general salience of the
Israeli-Palestinian conict is in itself insucient for triggering hate crimes. is is evident by the
insignicant eect of non-violent conict news, reported in Section 5.3. ird, the asymmetric
eects of both aacks and reporting on conict violence, reported in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, fur-
ther suggest that general conict violence or reporting does not trigger hate crime. Although we
could not reject that the eect of Israeli aacks and reporting on Israeli violence was signicantly
dierent across anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes, we nd that the identity of the aacker
maers for whether Jews or Muslims are subject to hate crimes. We only nd signicant eects
of aacks on the religious group associated with the aacker. Taken together, this emphasizes
the importance of the type of conict event or news reporting as opposed to the general intensity
of ghting or reporting for triggering hate crimes. Specically, this suggests that perpetrators
are driven by some form of retaliatory motive and that they are aached to conict actors, in
one form or another. An alternative interpretation, which need not be mutually exclusive, is that
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violent conict news, and in particular news on violence commied by a specic actor, more ef-
fectively triggers pre-existing animosity primarily towards groups associated with that specic
actor.
6 Concluding Remarks
We document that social identity ties facilitate the spread of violent conict. Using daily data
on conict fatalities and U.S. news coverage of the conict between 2000-2016, we examine if
the Israeli-Palestinian conict causes hate crime towards Jews and Muslims in the U.S. We nd
the same paern in conict spillovers using both conict measures: anti-Jewish hate crimes in-
crease aer Israeli aacks and anti-Islamic hate crimes increase aer Palestinian aacks. How-
ever, we nd no eect of non-violent news reporting on hate crimes, nor do we nd that the
ethno-religious group not associated with the aacker is subjected to hate crimes. Together, the
ndings indicate that conict events trigger a retaliatory motive among perpetrators, inducing
violent behavior against American Jews and Muslims. While news reporting both in the U.S. and
Europe have indicated that the Israeli-Palestinian conict may trigger anti-Jewish hate crime,
there has been lile reporting on how the conict aect Muslims living outside of the conict
vicinity. Recently, however, U.S. news media have reported on both anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish
hate crimes with a clear connection to the 2021 Israeli-Palestinian crisis.17
We speculate that social identity ties are likely to have an even larger role in the transmission
of violence in seings where civil conict or larger scale violence are at risk. e reason is that
animosity directed at groups with identity ties to foreign conict actors are likely to interact with,
and possibly amplify, other channels through which conicts might spill over. For example, co-
ethnics involved in conict abroad might provide important information and inspiration for how
to increase political power in the domestic scene by mobilizing along ethnic lines. Such informa-
tion diusion might be more eectively transmied through a lens of inter-ethnic animosity and
hatred. e emotional response to inter-ethnic animosity might also facilitate such mobilization
by galvanizing members of these groups into action. Our documented mechanism might also in-
teract with spill-over mechanisms unrelated to identity ties. For example, inter-ethnic animosity
and violence might boost the demand-side of regional markets for violence. is might in turn
facilitate the cross-border activities of violent underground actors – such as warlords, terrorist
organizations, or organized crime – that oen operate on the supply-side of such markets, and
which are recognized as major sources of regional instability (Silve and Verdier, 2018). An impor-
17See ’Death to Palestine’ spray painted on Brooklyn mosque, ABC7 NY, 05-13-2021, accessed 05-21-2021, and
Antisemitic incidents heightened across U.S. amid Israel-Gaza ghting; mosques were damaged, too, NBC News,
05-21-2021, Accessed 05-24-2021.
33
tant endeavor for further research is to understand how and under what conditions the spread of
inter-group animosity is important for conict contagion.
Indeed, there are strong reasons to believe that the cross-border spread of animosity through
identity ties could have important ramications beyond violent and criminal behavior. For ex-
ample, it might deteriorate inter-group trust and, as a result, adversely aect trade relationships
with non-negligible economic costs. In recent work, Korovkin and Makarin (2019) show that
the trade relationships between Ukraine and Russia clearly deteriorated in response to the 2014
Russia-Ukraine conict even in areas not directly aected by combat. Other research shows that
inter-group conict can increase the salience of social identities (Shayo, 2020), thereby, aect-
ing behavior, such as court orders (Shayo and Zussman, 2011) and consumption paerns (Atkin,
Colson-Sihra and Shayo, 2019). Animosity directed towards a certain minority can also have
long-term eects on the groups’ rate of assimilation, labour market participation, and ethnic
identication (Gould and Klor, 2016). Mis et al. (2019) provides an extreme example, where
anti-Muslim hostility in Europe might have increased Muslim radicalization and support for ISIS.
As news and social media reporting becomes ever more rapid, individuals all over the globe
can take part of violent conict events in real time. Research shows that propaganda in con-
ict contexts may eectively promote ethnic violence (DellaVigna et al., 2014; Yanagizawa-Dro,
2014). However, we know lile about how the framing of violent conict in mass media might
cause violent spillovers. Hence, an important future research agenda is whether the extent and
type of mass media reporting might be signicant for the spread of violence. Perhaps this is even
more important for largely unmoderated social media content, which has been suggested to fuel
inter-group animosity and violence in, for example, Myanmar and the Philippines.
We show that conict can have violent spillovers and that victimization can transcend the
conict locality. ere are reasons to believe that the spillover eects of conicts are not re-
stricted to violent and criminal behavior but are far more encompassing. With increasing migra-
tion and technological advancement, the consequences of regional conicts may, thus, become
less bounded to the vicinity of the conict.
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Table A1: Seasonal Variation in Hate Crimes, Conict Victims and Conict News 2000-2016 Excluding 6 Months Following e 9/11
Aacks

















Obs. Share Obs. Share Obs. Share Obs. Share Share Min/day Min/day Min/day Min/day Min/day
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Total 13652 1 2606 1 1111 1 9038 1 0.15 0.24 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.06
Day of the week
Monday 2194 0.16 365 0.14 116 0.10 1118 0.12 0.15 0.23 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.05
Tuesday 2030 0.15 342 0.13 200 0.18 1318 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05
Wednesday 1904 0.14 384 0.15 204 0.18 1337 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.04
ursday 1995 0.15 373 0.14 181 0.16 1351 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06
Friday 2168 0.16 407 0.16 138 0.12 1284 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.06
Saturday 1661 0.12 380 0.15 102 0.09 1432 0.16 0.17 0.29 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.07
Sunday 1700 0.12 355 0.14 170 0.15 1198 0.13 0.21 0.36 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.11
Month of the year
January 968 0.07 158 0.06 68 0, 06 1298 0, 14 0.16 0.25 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.10
Febraury 881 0.06 139 0.05 45 0, 04 314 0, 03 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.07
March 1203 0.09 217 0.08 189 0, 17 666 0, 07 0.18 0.29 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.05
April 1428 0.10 234 0.09 83 0, 07 554 0, 06 0.14 0.42 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.08
May 1268 0.09 247 0.09 84 0, 08 435 0, 05 0.17 0.22 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06
June 1113 0.08 209 0.08 136 0, 12 342 0, 04 0.20 0.27 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09
July 963 0.07 241 0.09 117 0, 11 2041 0, 23 0.21 0.36 0.08 0.20 0.03 0.05
August 1103 0.08 221 0.08 95 0, 09 932 0, 10 0.19 0.27 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08
September 1083 0.08 279 0.11 59 0, 05 350 0, 04 0.13 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05
October 1349 0.10 216 0.08 90 0, 08 604 0, 07 0.14 0.27 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.04
November 1241 0.09 224 0.09 98 0, 09 666 0, 07 0.15 0.22 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.05
December 1052 0.08 221 0.08 47 0, 04 836 0, 09 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04
Note: Hate crime data from FBI (2018), data on fatalities from B’Tselem and data on conict news from Vanderbilt Television News Archive. e exact sample
period is 09-29-2000 – 10-09-2001 and 01-03-2002 – 12-31-2016. e table shows seasonal variation over month of the year and day of the week for anti-Jewish
and anti-Islamic hate crime incidents, Israeli and Palestinian victims, and conict news on ABC, CBS and NBC. For hate crime and victim data, observation refers
to the number of incidents and victims, and share refers to the share of incidents or victims on a given day of the week or month. e rst conict news column
shows the share of weekday or month with any conict news reporting. e second conict news column shows the average length of conict news on the three
networks, and the last four columns splits the conict news variable into four categories, explained further in section 3.3.
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Table A2: Hate Crimes Against Jews and Muslims 2000-2016, Excluding 6 Months Aer 9/11
Anti-Jewish Anti-Islamic
Obs. Share Obs. Share
Most common locations
Residence/Home 3997 0.29 567 0.22
School/College 1794 0.13 150 0.06
Church/Synagogue/Temple 1077 0.08 317 0.12
Highway/Road/Alley 1054 0.08 343 0.13
Other/Unknown 5730 0.42 1229 0.47
Most common oense types
Destruction of property/Vandalism 9310 0.68 766 0.29
Intimidation 2916 0.21 944 0.36
Simple assault 807 0.06 522 0.20
Aggravated assault 175 0.01 191 0.07
Other 444 0.03 183 0.07
Most common oense states
New York 3532 0.26 270 0.10
New Jersey 2855 0.21 187 0.07
California 2075 0.15 339 0.13
Massachuses 804 0.06 161 0.06
Michigan 234 0.02 286 0.11
Ohio 164 0.01 117 0.04
Other 3988 0.29 1246 0.48
Level of violence
Violent Hate Crimes 4049 0.30 1724 0.66
Non-Violent Hate Crimes 9603 0.70 882 0.34
Note: Data from the FBI (2018). e table shows the most common locations, the most common oense types,
the most common states, and the level of violence for anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime incidents. Vio-
lent Hate Crimes include the following categories: aggravated assault, murder/non-negligent manslaughter, neg-
ligent manslaughter, statutory rape, forcible fondling, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, intimidation, arson, kidnap-
ping/abduction, sexual assault with an object, simple assault, and robbery. is loosely follows the denition of
”Crime of Violence” used by United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines (2018). Observations refers to the
number of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes. Share refers to the share of hate crimes within the hate crime
category. e exact sample period is 09-29-2000 – 10-09-2001 and 01-03-2002 – 12-31-2018.
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Network Included Filter Coding
middle east / israel and lebanon / violence (Studio: Charles Gibson)e eort to get more U.N. peace-
keeping troops into southern Lebanon reported; scenes
shown of French troops arriving.
20 sec 6 ABC No Only Israel NA
middle east / palestinians / factional violence (West Bank: Tom Aspell) the power struggle among rival
Palestinian factions updated; scenes shown of a Hamas
victory parade in Gaza and Fatah militiamen trashing
Hamas oces in theWest Bank.






middle east / israelis vs. palestinians / vio-
lence
(Jerusalem: Gillian Findlay) Israel’s calling o of cease-
re talks about another suicide bombing in Jerusalem fea-
tured; scenes shown from the bombing site in the street
and of victims on the hospital; details given of Palestinian
Authority president Yasir Arafat condemnation of today’s
aack.




middle east violence / israeli aacks (Tel Aviv: David Hawkins) Israeli aacks against Pales-
tinian targets in the West Bank and Gaza in retaliation
for a wave of terrorist aacks reported; scenes shown on
the bomb aack sites and air strikes ordered by Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon against the Palestinian Au-
thority.







middle east / west bank / jenin (Tel Aviv: Mark Phillips)e ”second bale” of Jenin,West
Bank, to determine what happened during the Israeli at-
tack on the Palestinian refugee camp featured; scenes
shown of the damages; details given of the contrasting
versions of what happened. [Assistant Secretary of State
Williams BURNS - says we are seeing a human tragedy.]
[Palestinianminister Ziad ABU ZAYYAD - cites the need
for an international peacekeeping force.] [Israeli govern-
ment spokesman Mark SOFER - comments on casualty ru-
mors.]






Note: Data from Vanderbilt Television News Archive. e table illustrates how news on the Israeli-Palestinian conict are ltered out from all news stories that
appear on the thirty minute evening news on ABC, CBS or NBC. Each row shows information provided by VTNA on ve dierent news stories. We look for
stories including the words Israel, Jerusal, Tel Aviv, Palestine, Gaza, West Bank or Hamas or any words with related roots. However, to be included in our sample
of stories, at least one of the following three conditions must apply: 1) the headline contains both an Israeli and Palestinian reference, 2) the headline contains
an Israeli reference and the summary a Palestinian reference, 3) the headline contains a Palestinian reference and the summary an Israeli reference. Row 1 and 2
are examples of stories that are ltered out, and row 3-5 are examples of stories that are included based on the three word lters.
41
Table A4: Holidays and Events Included as Controls
Holidays and events
Jewish and Israeli Chanukah, Lag BaOmer, Leil Selichot, Pesach, Pesach Sheni, Purim, Purim Katan, Rosh
Hashana, Shavuot, Shmini Atzeret, Shushan Purim, Simchat Torah, Sukkot, Tish’a B’Av,
Tu B’Av, Tu BiShvat, Yom Kippur, Yom HaShoah, Yom Ha’atzmaut/Israeli Independence
Day, Yom Hazikaron/Israeli’s Memorial Day
Islamic and Palestinian Eid al-Adha, Muharram, e Prophet’s Birthday, Isra and Mi’raj, Ramadan, Lailat al-
Qadr, Eid al-Fitr, Al Nakba Day
Christian Epiphany, AshWednesday, Palm Sunday, Maundyursday, Holy Saturday, Easter Sun-
day, Easter Monday, Ascension Day, Pentecost, Whit Monday, Trinity Sunday, Corpus
Christi, Assumption of Mary, Feast of St Francis of Assisi, All Saints’ Day, All Souls’ Day,
First Sunday of Advent, Feast of the Immaculate Conception, Christmas Eve
Federal New Year’s Day, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, Presidents’ Day, Memorial Day, Indepen-
dence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day, anksgiving Day, Christmas Day
Major events General election, Congress start session, Main party national conventions, Special con-
gressional elections, Gubernatorial elections, Presidential inauguration, State primary,
Presidential caucuses, Special Senate elections, Iowa caucuses, Other presidential pri-
maries, Other presidential caucuses, Statewide elections, State of the Union address, Su-
per Tuesday, New Hampshire Presidential Primary, FIFA World Cup, FIFA World Cup
Final
Note: e table shows all holidays and events included as control variables. e selection of holidays and events is described in Section 4.1.
42
Table A5: e Eect of Conict Fatalities on Hate Crime



















(t) 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(t-1) 0.003∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗ -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
(t-2) 0.002 0.001 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗









(t) 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
(t-1) 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.043∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
(t-2) 0.000 0.000 -0.015 -0.018







FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5765 5763 5761 5755 5765 5763 5761 5755
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.052
Mean dependent var. 2.368 2.366 2.365 2.364 0.452 0.452 0.451 0.451
Sd. of dependent var. 1.845 1.843 1.843 1.841 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
F-test Isr. aacks (p-value) 0.112 0.015 0.006 0.007 0.119 0.301 0.010 0.041
F-test Pal. aacks (p-value) 0.472 0.568 0.826 0.839 0.641 0.001 0.002 0.000
Note: edependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1-4) andMuslims (columns
5-8). In column 1 and 5, the independent variables are the total number of victims from an aack from the respective
sides at day t. Subsequent columns add up to 5 lags of the independent variables, where column 4 and 8 includes
the total fatalities from aacks from the respective sides at t to t-5. All models control for year, calendar-month
and weekday xed eects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented
in Section 4.1. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West
standard errors allowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
43
Table A6: Non-linear Eects of Conict Fatalities on Hate Crime and Conict News
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Anti-Jewish Anti-Islamic Any News Length of News Israeli Violence Both Violence Palestinian Violence
Israeli aacks (t and t-1)
1 victim
(percentiles: [52-67], 925 dates)
0.037 -0.079 0.016 0.006 0.002 -0.005 0.017∗
(0.030) (0.066) (0.012) (0.022) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
2-6 victims
(percentiles: (67,90], 1400 dates)
0.034 0.162∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.065∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.022 0.014
(0.028) (0.061) (0.014) (0.032) (0.012) (0.020) (0.009)
7-10 victims
(percentiles: (90,95], 238 dates)
-0.039 -0.056 0.139∗∗∗ 0.115 0.009 0.115 -0.014
(0.048) (0.125) (0.033) (0.092) (0.025) (0.064) (0.030)
11-38 victims
(percentiles: (95,99], 217 dates)
0.048 0.167 0.340∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ -0.085∗
(0.054) (0.128) (0.043) (0.180) (0.081) (0.135) (0.034)
>38 victims
(percentiles: (99-100], 59 dates)
0.347∗∗∗ 0.242 0.742∗∗∗ 3.392∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗ 2.099∗∗∗ -0.052
(0.094) (0.212) (0.052) (0.517) (0.251) (0.466) (0.066)
Palestinian aacks (t and t-1)
1 victim
(percentiles: [87-93), 371 dates)
0.039 0.021 0.012 0.078 0.095∗ 0.038 0.010
(0.042) (0.096) (0.024) (0.062) (0.048) (0.042) (0.013)
2 victims
(percentiles: [93-95], 136 dates)
0.005 -0.071 0.073 0.093 -0.049 0.123 0.031
(0.071) (0.129) (0.044) (0.128) (0.046) (0.109) (0.021)
3-10 victims
(percentiles: (95-99], 205 dates)
0.047 0.183 0.275∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.006 0.227∗ 0.427∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.136) (0.044) (0.167) (0.060) (0.107) (0.074)
>11 victims
(percentiles: [99-100), 49 dates)
0.057 0.423∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 2.100∗∗∗ -0.204∗ 1.069∗∗∗ 1.349∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.156) (0.047) (0.273) (0.083) (0.236) (0.245)
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5765 5765 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700
Mean dependent var. 2.368 0.452 0.156 0.247 0.054 0.090 0.038
Sd. of dependent var. 1.845 0.732 0.363 0.894 0.354 0.559 0.281
Model ML NB ML NB OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.032 0.052 0.324 0.405 0.180 0.315 0.308
F-test Palestinian aacks 0.792 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.000
F-test Israeli aacks 0.003 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056
Note: e independent variables are victims from Israeli and Palestinian aacks day t and t-1 categorized by mutually exclusive percentile dummy variables within
each group. For victims of Israeli aacks, the rst variable indicates dates with a fatal aack with one victim the last two days, representing the 52th to the 67th
percentiles of Israeli aack dates and a total of 925 dates in our sample. e rest of the variables are specied analogously in the table. In columns 1 and 2, the
dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews and Muslims, respectively. In column 3, the independent variable is a dummy for any conict
news. Column 4 uses as independent variable the length of conict news, while columns 5-7 uses conict reporting focusing respectively on either Israeli violence,
violence from both sides, or Palestinian violence. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday xed eects, as well as a set of controls for holidays,
events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. Columns 1-2 are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model. Column 3-4 are
estimated using OLS. Newey West standard errors allowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A7: e eect of conict fatalities on placebo hate crime categories









Length of conict news, today and yesterday, covering…
Israeli aacks -0.000 0.004(0.010) (0.019)
Both sides aacking 0.003 0.001(0.005) (0.010)
Palestinian aacks 0.007 0.037(0.012) (0.024)
Top 1% conict news, today and yesterday, covering …
Israeli aacks 0.049 -0.054(0.054) (0.117)
Both sides aacking 0.035 -0.047(0.054) (0.112)
Palestinian aacks 0.010 0.053(0.055) (0.112)
Boom 99% conict news, today and yesterday, covering …
Israeli aacks 0.002 0.041(0.023) (0.058)
Both sides aacking -0.007 -0.012(0.022) (0.049)
Palestinian aacks -0.009 0.079(0.024) (0.060)
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5633 5633 5633 5633
Mean dependent var. 6.364 1.249 6.364 1.249
Sd. of dependent var. 3.001 1.219 3.001 1.219
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
Pseudo R-squared 0.057 0.032 0.057 0.032
Note: e dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Blacks
(columns 1,3) and Hispanics (columns 2,4). e independent variables are the to-
tal number of victims the past two days from Israeli aacks and Palestinian aacks
(columns 1 and 2) and dummy variables indicating top percentile aacks and smaller
aacks for each side (columns 3 and 4). All models control for year, calendar-month and
weekday xed eects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pres-
sure which are presented in Section 4.1. All models are estimated using a maximum-
likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for
auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A8: e Eect of Conict News on Hate Crime. Lag Specication

















Coverage of Israeli aacks day…
(t) 0.075∗∗ 0.055∗ 0.053∗ 0.048 0.063 0.038 0.041 0.027
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.048) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059)
(t-1) 0.027 0.011 0.011 0.035 0.015 0.032
(0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.058) (0.060) (0.056)
(t-2) 0.021 0.005 0.041 0.024







Coverage of both sides aacking day…
(t) 0.061∗∗∗ 0.035 0.035 0.032 0.029 -0.010 -0.013 -0.023
(0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.044) (0.046) (0.048)
(t-1) 0.032∗ 0.017 0.007 0.039 0.019 0.011
(0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.047) (0.063) (0.062)
(t-2) 0.025 0.002 0.019 -0.003







Coverage of Palestinian aacks day…
(t) 0.052 0.053 0.047 0.054 0.158∗ 0.127 0.129 0.154∗
(0.031) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.066) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074)
(t-1) -0.021 -0.023 -0.028 0.098 0.081 0.043
(0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.063) (0.068) (0.068)
(t-2) -0.017 -0.027 0.015 0.016







FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5700 5633 5566 5365 5700 5633 5566 5365
Mean dependent var. 2.370 2.369 2.366 2.363 0.449 0.449 0.447 0.440
Sd. of dependent var. 1.843 1.843 1.843 1.839 0.729 0.729 0.728 0.718
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
Pseudo R-squared 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.052
F-test Israeli aacks 0.001 0.039 0.136 0.288 0.193 0.416 0.564 0.809
F-test Both sides aacking 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.342 0.650 0.875 0.946
F-test Palestinian aacks 0.099 0.307 0.511 0.404 0.016 0.003 0.023 0.090
Note: edependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1-4) andMuslims (columns
5-8). In columns 1 and 5, the independent variables are our measures of the length of conict-related news in the
U.S. at day t. Subsequent columns gradually adds one, two and ve lags of the independent variables. All models
are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for
auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A9: e Eect of Conict News on Placebo Hate Crime Categories









Length of conict news, today and yesterday, covering…
Israeli aacks -0.000 0.004(0.010) (0.019)
Both sides aacking 0.003 0.001(0.005) (0.010)
Palestinian aacks 0.007 0.037(0.012) (0.024)
Top 1% conict news, today and yesterday, covering …
Israeli aacks 0.049 -0.054(0.054) (0.117)
Both sides aacking 0.035 -0.047(0.054) (0.112)
Palestinian aacks 0.010 0.053(0.055) (0.112)
Boom 99% conict news, today and yesterday, covering …
Israeli aacks 0.002 0.041(0.023) (0.058)
Both sides aacking -0.007 -0.012(0.022) (0.049)
Palestinian aacks -0.009 0.079(0.024) (0.060)
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5633 5633 5633 5633
Mean dependent var. 6.364 1.249 6.364 1.249
Sd. of dependent var. 3.001 1.219 3.001 1.219
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
Pseudo R-squared 0.057 0.032 0.057 0.032
Note: e dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Blacks
(columns 1,3) and Hispanics (columns 2,4). e dependent variables are the total num-
ber of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1 and 3) and Muslims (columns 2 and 4). e
independent variables are our measures of the length of conict-related news aggre-
gated for day t and t-1 and two mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating days
with less or top percentile news reporting within each type of reporting. All models
control for year, calendar-month and weekday xed eects, as well as a set of controls
for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. All mod-
els are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey
West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in
parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Coverage of Israeli aacks (t and t-1)
>0 to 0.62 minutes
(percentiles: [92-95), 151 dates)
-0.056 -0.034
(0.058) (0.154)
0.63 to 2.91 minutes
(percentiles: [95-99), 219 dates)
-0.007 0.086
(0.047) (0.122)
2.92 to 13.6 minutes
(percentiles: [99-100], 56 dates)
0.234∗ 0.193
(0.097) (0.155)
Coverage of both sides aacking (t and t-1)
>0 to 0.77 minutes
(percentiles: [91-95), 179 dates)
0.091 0.039
(0.053) (0.116)
0.78 to 4.22 minutes
(percentiles: [95-99), 223 dates)
0.096 0.147
(0.052) (0.112)
4.23 to 17.2 minutes
(percentiles: [99-100], 56 dates)
0.300∗∗∗ 0.126
(0.089) (0.216)
Coverage of Palestinian aacks (t and t-1)
>0 to 0.11 minutes
(percentiles: [94-95), 42 dates)
-0.058 -0.068
(0.107) (0.339)
0.16 to 2.27 minutes
(percentiles: [95-99), 213 dates)
0.007 0.155
(0.052) (0.115)
2.33 to 8.5 minutes
(percentiles: [99-100], 56 dates)
0.092 0.377∗
(0.082) (0.156)
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes
Observations 5633 5633
Mean dependent var. 2.369 0.449
Sd. of dependent var. 1.843 0.729
Model ML NB ML NB
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.033 0.050
F-test Israeli aacks (p-value) 0.070 0.584
F-test both sides aacking (p-value) 0.001 0.599
F-test Palestinian aacks (p-value) 0.659 0.070
Note: e dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (column 1) and Muslims (column
2). e independent variables are our measures of the length of conict-related news aggregated for day t and t-1
and categorized by mutually exclusive percentile dummy variables. e rst variable indicates conict news greater
than 0 up to the 95th percentile, the second from the 95th percentile to the 99th percentile, and the last variable
indicates conict news in the top percentile. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday xed eects,
as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. All models
are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for
auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A11: Robustness Checks: Introducing Controls
Panel A: Conict Fatalities





















Top 1% Israeli aacks, t and t-1
(>40 victims, 57 dates)
0.348∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.265 0.279 0.285 0.270 0.258
(0.091) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.087) (0.213) (0.216) (0.211) (0.209) (0.198)
Top 1% Palestinian aacks, t and t-1
(>10 victims, 46 dates)
0.071 0.056 0.057 0.056 0.045 0.434∗∗ 0.438∗∗ 0.442∗∗ 0.440∗∗ 0.410∗∗
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.153) (0.157) (0.156) (0.156) (0.155)
Smaller aacks from either side Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays - Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political events - - Yes Yes Yes - - Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) - - - Yes Yes - - - Yes Yes
2 lags dep. var - - - - Yes - - - - Yes
Observations 5767 5767 5767 5765 5761 5767 5767 5767 5765 5761
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.027 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.044 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.053
Panel B: Conict News





















Top 1% Israeli Violence (t and t-1) 0.231∗ 0.227∗ 0.231∗ 0.233∗ 0.211∗ 0.216 0.220 0.206 0.196 0.177
(0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.093) (0.150) (0.152) (0.151) (0.155) (0.153)
Top 1% Both Violence (t and t-1) 0.308∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗ 0.108 0.133 0.137 0.139 0.100
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.086) (0.216) (0.213) (0.210) (0.212) (0.208)
Top 1% Palestinian Violence (t and t-1) 0.080 0.090 0.092 0.089 0.080 0.380∗ 0.378∗ 0.373∗ 0.381∗ 0.388∗∗
(0.084) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.081) (0.155) (0.154) (0.153) (0.156) (0.150)
Boom 99% reporting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays - Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political events - - Yes Yes Yes - - Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) - - - Yes Yes - - - Yes Yes
2 lags dep. var - - - - Yes - - - - Yes
Observations 5635 5635 5635 5633 5631 5635 5635 5635 5633 5631
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.021 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.038 0.047 0.048 0.050 0.053
Note: e dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1-5) and Muslims (columns 6-10). e independent variables in Panel
A are days with top percentile aacks from each side today or yesterday, and in Panel B days with top percentile news reporting today or yesterday, split by
type of violence reported on. Controls are presented in Section 3. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model. Newey West
standard errors allowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A12: Robustness Checks: Dropping Conict Periods
Panel A: Conict Fatalities




































Top 1% Israeli aacks (t and t-1)
(>40 victims, 57 dates)
0.351∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗ 0.227∗ 0.269 0.075 0.353 0.192 0.228
(0.093) (0.107) (0.092) (0.101) (0.109) (0.209) (0.238) (0.227) (0.232) (0.298)
Top 1% Palestinian aacks (t and t-1)
(>10 victims, 46 dates)
0.056 0.226 0.048 0.058 0.044 0.440∗∗ 0.884∗ 0.433∗∗ 0.442∗∗ 0.403∗
(0.080) (0.277) (0.080) (0.080) (0.082) (0.157) (0.361) (0.156) (0.157) (0.167)
Smaller aacks from either side Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FEs, holidays, events, news pressure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5765 4367 5742 5757 5715 5765 4367 5742 5757 5715
Mean dependent var. 2.368 2.244 2.367 2.367 2.366 0.452 0.464 0.453 0.451 0.451
Sd. of dependent var. 1.845 1.756 1.844 1.844 1.848 0.732 0.745 0.733 0.732 0.733
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
Share vic. excluded fr. PA 0.000 0.756 0.008 0.005 0.062 0.000 0.756 0.008 0.005 0.062
Share vic. excluded fr. IA 0.000 0.318 0.155 0.019 0.246 0.000 0.318 0.155 0.019 0.246
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.032 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.051
Panel B: Conict News




































Top 1% Israeli Violence (t and t-1) 0.233∗ 0.199 0.316∗∗∗ 0.229∗ 0.177 0.196 -0.165 0.250 0.220 0.207
(0.098) (0.213) (0.091) (0.098) (0.095) (0.155) (0.282) (0.163) (0.153) (0.164)
Top 1% Both Violence (t and t-1) 0.309∗∗∗ 0.078 0.336∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗ 0.139 0.521∗ 0.085 -0.022 0.108
(0.091) (0.113) (0.094) (0.097) (0.097) (0.212) (0.253) (0.231) (0.221) (0.244)
Top 1% Palestinian Violence (t and t-1) 0.089 0.432 0.086 0.086 0.046 0.381∗ 0.025 0.393∗ 0.406∗∗ 0.379∗
(0.083) (0.263) (0.083) (0.083) (0.076) (0.156) (0.502) (0.156) (0.154) (0.165)
Boom 99% reporting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FEs, holidays, events, news pressure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5633 4251 5610 5627 5583 5633 4251 5610 5627 5583
Mean dependent var. 2.369 2.247 2.368 2.369 2.367 0.449 0.460 0.450 0.448 0.448
Sd. of dependent var. 1.843 1.756 1.842 1.844 1.846 0.729 0.741 0.729 0.728 0.729
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
Share Conict News Excl. 0.000 0.621 0.054 0.024 0.075 0.000 0.621 0.054 0.024 0.075
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.033 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.050 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.050
Note: e dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1-5) and Muslims (columns 6-10). e independent variables in Panel A are days with top percentile aacks
from each side today or yesterday, and in Panel B days with top percentile news reporting today or yesterday, split by type of violence reported on. Column 1 and 5 includes the whole sample period
between 2000-2016, while subsequent columns excludes one conict period at the time. e denition of these conict periods are further explained in Section 3. All models control for year, calendar-
month and weekday xed eects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative
binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A13: Robustness Checks: Violent Conict News and Dropping Conict Periods




































Top 1% Violent Conict News (t and t-1) 0.421∗∗∗ 0.356∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.436∗ 0.453 0.433∗ 0.327 0.456∗
(0.081) (0.163) (0.083) (0.090) (0.082) (0.177) (0.276) (0.190) (0.188) (0.187)
Boom 99% reporting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FEs, holidays, events, news pressure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5700 4309 5677 5693 5650 5700 4309 5677 5693 5650
Mean dependent var. 2.370 2.247 2.369 2.369 2.368 0.449 0.460 0.450 0.448 0.448
Sd. of dependent var. 1.843 1.754 1.842 1.843 1.846 0.729 0.741 0.730 0.729 0.730
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
Share Conict News Excl. 0.000 0.621 0.054 0.024 0.075 0.000 0.621 0.054 0.024 0.075
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.032 0.030 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.050 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.050
Note: e dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1-5) and Muslims (columns 6-10). e independent variable is days with top percentile news reporting today
or yesterday. Column 1 and 5 includes the whole sample period between 2000-2016, while subsequent columns excludes one conict period at the time. e denition of these conict periods are further
explained in Section 3. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday xed eects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. All
models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.00151
Table A14: Robustness Checks: Dropping States
Panel A: Conict Fatalities



















Top 1% Israeli aacks, t and t-1
(>40 victims, 57 dates)
0.304∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.292 0.220 0.069
(0.098) (0.096) (0.096) (0.218) (0.218) (0.232)
Top 1% Palestinian aacks, t and t-1
(>10 victims, 46 dates)
0.040 0.092 0.099 0.517∗∗ 0.464∗∗ 0.435∗∗
(0.085) (0.089) (0.090) (0.160) (0.160) (0.159)
Smaller aacks from either side Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5765 5765 5765 5765 5765 5765
Mean dependent var. 2.008 1.873 1.755 0.393 0.419 0.405
Sd. of dependent var. 1.685 1.579 1.557 0.672 0.701 0.687
Share of hate crimes excluded 0.152 0.209 0.259 0.130 0.072 0.104
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
F-test Independent variable(s) 0.012 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.017 0.057
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.029 0.025 0.041 0.049 0.054 0.049
Panel B: Conict News



















Top 1% Israeli Violence, t and t-1 0.161 0.316∗∗ 0.146 0.051 0.173 0.270
(0.102) (0.109) (0.107) (0.174) (0.191) (0.155)
Top 1% Both Violence, t and t-1 0.221∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.234∗ 0.128 0.166 -0.070
(0.102) (0.094) (0.113) (0.239) (0.232) (0.218)
Top 1% Palestinian Violence, t and t-1 0.117 0.087 0.103 0.382∗ 0.441∗∗ 0.428∗∗
(0.088) (0.094) (0.097) (0.160) (0.167) (0.161)
Boom 99% reporting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5633 5633 5633 5633 5633 5633
Mean dependent var. 2.009 1.870 1.760 0.391 0.417 0.402
Sd. of dependent var. 1.684 1.576 1.557 0.669 0.698 0.683
Share of hate crimes excluded 0.152 0.209 0.259 0.130 0.072 0.104
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
F-test Independent variable(s) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.030 0.026 0.041 0.048 0.054 0.048
Note: edependent variable is the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1-3) andMuslims (columns 4-6). e independent variables
in Panel A are days with top percentile aacks from each side today or yesterday, and in Panel B days with top percentile news reporting today or
yesterday, split by type of violence reported on. Column 1 and 4 exclude hate crimes in California, column 2 and 5 exclude hate crimes in the state
of New Jersey, while column 3 and 6 excludes hate crimes in the state of New York. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday
xed eects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. All models are estimated using
a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in
parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A15: Robustness Checks: Model Specication
Panel A: Conict Fatalities



















Top 1% Israeli aacks (t and t-1)
(>40 victims, 57 dates)
0.351∗∗∗ 0.269 0.256∗∗ 0.082 0.866∗∗∗ 0.139 0.414 0.249
(0.093) (0.209) (0.081) (0.067) (0.250) (0.115) (0.286) (0.221)
Top 1% Palestinian aacks (t and t-1)
(>10 victims, 46 dates)
0.056 0.440∗∗ 0.053 0.141∗ 0.156 0.260∗ 0.210 0.362∗
(0.080) (0.157) (0.067) (0.061) (0.227) (0.112) (0.286) (0.172)
Smaller aacks from either side Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5765 5765 5765 5765 5765 5765 5669 5765
Mean dependent var. 2.368 0.452 1.062 0.278 2.368 0.452 0.862 0.341
Sd. of dependent var. 1.845 0.732 0.572 0.408 1.845 0.732 0.345 0.474
Model ML NB ML NB OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit
Pseudo R-squared 0.032 0.051 0.109 0.089 0.112 0.095 0.061 0.056
Panel B: Conict News



















Top 1% Israeli Violence (t and t-1) 0.233∗ 0.196 0.174 0.066 0.724∗ 0.107 0.125 0.223
(0.098) (0.155) (0.095) (0.048) (0.327) (0.087) (0.300) (0.146)
Top 1% Both Violence (t and t-1) 0.309∗∗∗ 0.139 0.234∗∗ 0.035 1.085∗∗ 0.082 0.376 0.057
(0.091) (0.212) (0.077) (0.060) (0.386) (0.107) (0.304) (0.198)
Top 1% Palestinian Violence (t and t-1) 0.089 0.381∗ 0.078 0.114∗ 0.231 0.217∗ -0.019 0.283
(0.083) (0.156) (0.074) (0.056) (0.237) (0.105) (0.239) (0.164)
Boom 99% reporting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5633 5633 5633 5633 5633 5633 5539 5633
Mean dependent var. 2.369 0.449 1.063 0.276 2.369 0.449 0.862 0.339
Sd. of dependent var. 1.843 0.729 0.572 0.407 1.843 0.729 0.345 0.474
Model ML NB ML NB OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit
Pseudo R-squared 0.033 0.050 0.112 0.087 0.116 0.093 0.062 0.055
Note: e independent variables in Panel A are days with top percentile aacks from each side today or yesterday, and in Panel B days with
top percentile news reporting today or yesterday, split by type of violence reported on. e dependent variable is the either total number of
hate crimes towards Jews or Muslims (columns 1,2,5,6), the analogous variables logged (columns 3-4) or collapsed into a dummy indicating the
occurrence of at least one hate crime columns (7-8). Column 1 and 2 uses a maximum-likehood negative binomial model, columns 3-6 uses an OLS,
and column 7-8 uses a Probit regression. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday xed eects, as well as a set of controls for
holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial
model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A16: Robustness Checks: Panel or Lag Structure
Weekly data Daily data

















Victims week t from…
Israeli aacks 0.001∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Palestinian aacks 0.003 0.026∗∗
(0.003) (0.010)
Conict news week t covering…
Israeli aacks 0.010 0.030
(0.010) (0.017)
Both sides aacking 0.012∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.004) (0.007)
Palestinian aacks 0.011 0.052∗
(0.008) (0.021)
Victims day t to t-2 from…
Israeli aacks 0.001∗∗ 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Palestinian aacks 0.003 0.013
(0.004) (0.008)
Conict news day t to t-2 covering…
Israeli aacks 0.027∗ 0.032
(0.012) (0.023)
Both sides aacking 0.026∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.005) (0.013)
Palestinian aacks 0.001 0.077∗∗
(0.014) (0.027)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DOW FEs - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 824 824 824 824 5761 5761 5566 5566
Mean dependent var. 16.568 3.163 16.568 3.163 2.365 0.451 2.366 0.447
Sd. of dependent var. 6.561 2.629 6.561 2.629 1.843 0.732 1.843 0.728
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
Pseudo R-squared 0.058 0.083 0.031 0.050
P-value (Coverage of) Isr. Aack β J ew = β I sl 0.023 0.197 0.738 0.814
P-value Coverage of both aacking β J ew = β I sl 0.224 0.154
P-value (Coverage of) Pal. Aack β J ew = β I sl 0.033 0.224 0.264 0.154
Note: e dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1,3, 5 and 7) and Muslims (columns 2,4,6 and 8).
e independent variables are the number of victims from Israeli and Palestinian aacks (columns 1,2,5 and 6), or the length of conict news
reporting (columns 3,4,7, and 8). Columns 1-4 collapses the data to weekly level and regresses the independent variables week t on the
same week aggregates of hate crimes, controlling for year and calendar-month xed eects. Columns 5-8 uses daily level data, but uses as
independent variables the aggregate of the past 3 days. Models in the daily data set in columns 5-8 control for year, calendar-month and
weekday xed eects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. e last two rows
present the p-values of a test for equality between the eects of Israeli or Palestinian aacks, or the analogous news variables, on anti-Jewish
and anti-Islamic hate crimes estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative
binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags in the daily data set, and 4 weeks in the
weekly data set.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A17: Agency Robustness













Palestinian aacks -0.017 0.460
∗∗
(0.090) (0.177)




Both sides aacking 0.273
∗∗ 0.132
(0.098) (0.236)
Palestinian aacks 0.047 0.366
∗
(0.101) (0.179)
Smaller aacks from either side Yes Yes - -
Boom 99% reporting - - Yes Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5765 5765 5633 5633
Mean dependent var. 2.184 0.420 2.186 0.418
Sd. of dependent var. 1.830 0.713 1.828 0.709
Share of hate crimes included 0.923 0.931 0.923 0.931
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.025 0.053 0.026 0.053
Note: e dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes towards Jews
(columns 1 and 3) and Muslims (columns 2 and 4). e independent variables are
top percentile Israeli and Palestinian aacks (columns 1 and 2) and top percentile
conict news reporting (columns 3 and 4). e sample is restricted to agencies
who, once they started partaking in the Uniform Crime Program remained in the
program for the sample period. All models control for year, calendar-month and
weekday xed eects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news
pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. All models are estimated using a
maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors
allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A18: Main Results and Future Larger Aacks

















Top 1% Israeli aacks day…
(t+3) 0.009 -0.106
(0.139) (0.237)
(t+2) 0.101 0.096 -0.288 -0.295
(0.091) (0.104) (0.340) (0.340)
(t+1) 0.087 0.040 0.047 -0.085 -0.028 -0.048
(0.099) (0.111) (0.115) (0.240) (0.238) (0.255)
(t and t-1) 0.351∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.269 0.215 0.238 0.248
(0.093) (0.096) (0.097) (0.100) (0.209) (0.251) (0.266) (0.263)
Top 1% Palestinian aacks day…
(t+3) -0.209∗ 0.225
(0.106) (0.173)
(t+2) 0.160 0.158 0.072 0.031
(0.090) (0.090) (0.198) (0.205)
(t+1) 0.071 0.057 0.058 0.338 0.286 0.282
(0.129) (0.125) (0.124) (0.210) (0.217) (0.218)
(t and t-1) 0.056 0.048 0.051 0.048 0.440∗∗ 0.399∗ 0.368∗ 0.360∗
(0.080) (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.157) (0.157) (0.159) (0.165)
Smaller aacks from either side Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5765 5765 5763 5761 5765 5765 5763 5761
Mean dependent var. 2.368 2.368 2.368 2.368 0.452 0.452 0.451 0.450
Sd. of dependent var. 1.845 1.845 1.845 1.845 0.732 0.732 0.731 0.731
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
F-test Isr. leads (p-value) 0.381 0.371 0.554 0.722 0.652 0.696
F-test Pal. leads (p-value) 0.580 0.195 0.077 0.107 0.364 0.275
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.051 0.052 0.053 0.053
Note: e dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1-4) and
Muslims (columns 5-8). e independent variables are days with top percentile aacks from each
side today or yesterday, controlling for top percentile aacks day t+1 (tomorrow) up to t+3. All
models control for year, calendar-month and weekday xed eects, as well as a set of controls for
holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. All models are estimated
using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing
for auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A19: Main Results and Future Extensive Coverage of Aacks

















Top 1% coverage of Israeli aacks day…
(t+3) 0.050 -0.008
(0.094) (0.259)
(t+2) 0.077 0.056 -0.247 -0.260
(0.107) (0.110) (0.239) (0.241)
(t+1) 0.003 -0.023 -0.022 0.149 0.130 0.125
(0.083) (0.082) (0.084) (0.187) (0.198) (0.196)
(t+t-1) 0.233∗ 0.234∗ 0.217∗ 0.208∗ 0.196 0.114 0.091 0.080
(0.098) (0.097) (0.094) (0.093) (0.155) (0.166) (0.174) (0.168)
Top 1% coverage of both aacking day…
(t+3) 0.079 -0.069
(0.103) (0.225)
(t+2) 0.200 0.153 -0.056 -0.031
(0.104) (0.122) (0.239) (0.280)
(t+1) 0.060 -0.032 -0.011 0.411 0.376 0.384
(0.105) (0.115) (0.114) (0.219) (0.227) (0.245)
(t+t-1) 0.309∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗ 0.251∗ 0.221 0.139 -0.213 -0.091 -0.069
(0.091) (0.103) (0.118) (0.120) (0.212) (0.258) (0.269) (0.281)
Top 1% coverage of Palestinian aacks day…
(t+3) -0.021 0.038
(0.093) (0.189)
(t+2) 0.117 0.130 -0.044 -0.041
(0.099) (0.102) (0.165) (0.167)
(t+1) 0.029 0.004 -0.006 -0.106 -0.152 -0.219
(0.088) (0.094) (0.094) (0.213) (0.220) (0.218)
(t+t-1) 0.089 0.094 0.064 0.072 0.381∗ 0.339∗ 0.355∗ 0.296
(0.083) (0.085) (0.086) (0.085) (0.156) (0.166) (0.165) (0.168)
Boom 99% reporting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holidays and events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5633 5568 5501 5434 5633 5568 5501 5434
Mean dependent var. 2.369 2.359 2.356 2.359 0.449 0.446 0.445 0.444
Sd. of dependent var. 1.843 1.834 1.830 1.832 0.729 0.726 0.722 0.721
Model ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB ML NB
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.050 0.052 0.053 0.053
F-test Isr. aacks leads (p-value) 0.973 0.722 0.820 0.426 0.537 0.714
F-test Both aacks leads (p-value) 0.566 0.139 0.079 0.061 0.248 0.480
F-test Pal. aacks leads (p-value) 0.742 0.473 0.436 0.619 0.703 0.537
Note: e dependent variables are the total number of hate crimes towards Jews (columns 1-4) and Muslims
(columns 5-8). e independent variables are days with top percentile news reporting today or yesterday,
split by type of violence reported on, controlling for the analogous variables for top percentile conict re-
porting day t+1 up to t+3. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday xed eects, as well as
a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.1. All models are
estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing
for auto-correlation of up to seven lags presented in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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